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ABSTRACT 
Today, many Western media impose a simplifying view of photographic reality 
by narrating African daily life under negative cliches that are perpetuated in time 
(poverty, famine, corruption, etc.) or recently, it is enough to look at the visual 
coverage and repercussions of the AI Shabaab dusit02 Hotel attack on the pages 
of the New York Times (De Freitas, 2015, January 15). 
That is why, in a globalized culture, Kenyans are asking themselves if there are 
any positive models or roles of their own that go beyond this one 'aesthetics of 
despair'. So, the question in this dissertation is: Can Western agency and media 
photography promote a broader view of reality and bring hope to new generations 
of Kenyans? 
To answer this question, we have done an analysis of the characteristics of 
Cartier-Bresson's photographic work under the philosophy of Gabriel Marcel. 
Both authors were French and intellectuals at the beginning of the 20th century: 
Henri Cattier-Bresson is considered the father of modern photojournalism and 
one of the pioneers of humanist photography; Marcel is a philosopher who 
considers hope the motor in existential life (because he considers that man is not 
a being thrown into the world). 
Thus, this dissertation offers a framework on what photography is, and what hope 
consists of. We study both fields, specifically, in Henri Cartier-Bresson and in 
Gabriel Marcel; and conclude with a symbiosis between the four characteristics 
of photography in Cattier-Bresson with the four notes of the philosophy of hope 
seen in Gabriel Marcel. 
Finally, since aesthetics is always a reflection of ethics, we consider the different 
types of 'photographic gazes' of a photojournalist (gaze of resignation, 
acceptance or redemption) to propose a gaze of hope that overcomes African 
stereotypes by proposing new paths to Kenyan society. This look is only possible 
through virtue in technical excellence and professional ethics. 
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1.1) Framework 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation of the philosophy of hope through photography is structured as 
follows: In chapter two we are going to carry out a general study of literature review 
gathering the diverse opinions expressed throughout history on the nature of the 
philosophy of hope and the nature of photography. In chapter three we explain the 
methodological research used for this topic . 
Later, chapter four reflects a presentation of research findings addressing, on the one 
hand, the characteristics of the philosophy of hope in Gabriel Marcel and, on the other 
hand, the characteristics of photography in Cartier-Bresson. 
In chapterfive we focus the discussion on an attempt to symbiosis the characteristics 
between the two authors. That is, an interpretation of Cartier-Bresson ' s gaze under the 
existentialism of Gabriel Marcel seeking to discover 'a glimpse of hope '. 
Chapter six focuses on recommendations for getting this glimpse of hope both in 
photojournalists working in Kenya and for potential photographers. In the case of 
photojournalists, we analyze both: their circumstances in Kenyan reality, as well as 
their work in a news agency and the different ways of seeing the world behind the 
camera. From a look that a photographer may have (which we will call) of resignation, 
to another look of acceptance and - to another final - of redemption before the world 
he portrays. In the case of potential photographers, we focus on how to learn to look 
and how to have a hopeful look. 
Finally, chapter seven closes this dissertation with three brief conclusions. 
1.2) Background to the dissertation 
As a photojournalist, I try to create optimism and hope with my work because without 
hope it is difficult to live. Also it is important to know the influence of images and 
messages in the media that shape public opinion about Africa, in general, and Kenya 
in particular. 
The Western media not only cr~:ate a limited version of reality but also a biased view 
to readers and viewers by repeating scenarios with texts and images about African 
worlds. These modes of saying (textual or visual) are repeatedly used towards global 
public opinion: arguing in an intentional direction and increasing with repetition 
stereotypes about African institutions, population groups or countries. 
The Western Media p01trays the reality of the African continent with images of the 
drama of Ebola, malaria, AIDS, destitution, war, crime and corruption. Tragedies that 
are exposed together with occasionally some green shoots of African development 
(called by some Afro-future). 
Generally, we can see that a certain visual evilness prevails over the black continent, a 
collective and euro-centric imaginary that seldom responds to plural African social 
reality. It is generally accepted that this interpretation was initiated especially by Joseph 
Conrad's iconography of his novel The Heart in Darkness (Conrad, 1899) and the 
philosophical stigma of German idealism headed by Hegel, who considered Africans 
as primitive beings ... "In Africa we find what has been called the 'age of innocence ', 
in which man is supposed to live according to God and nature. In this state, man is not 
yet conscious of himself. .. , this primitive natural state is actually a state of animality " 
(Hegel, 200 l , p. 172). 
As the late Kenyan writer Binyavanga Wainaina wrote ironically (2005), "never have 
a picture of a well-adjusted African on the cover of your book, or in it, unless that 
African has won the Nobel Prize . An AK-47, prominent ribs, naked breasts: use these . 
If you must include an African, make sure you get one in Masai or Zulu or Dogan dress 
[ .. .]And sunsets, the African sunset is a must.lt is always big and red. There is always 
a big sky .[ . . . } When writing about the plight of flora and fauna, make sure you mention 
that Africa is overpopulated. When your main character is in a desert or jungle living 
with indigenous peoples (anybody short) it is okay to mention that Africa has been 
severely depopulated by Aids and War (use caps) . [ ... ]Always end your book with 
Nelson Mandela saying something about rainbows or renaissances. Because you 
care". 
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It seems that Wainaina's narrative and visud councils have not fallen on de~f ears, as 
there are beginning to be specialized publications and permanent journalists who 
approach different African cultures with other perspectives. Thus, according to the 
opinion of the documentary filmmaker and director of the magazine Altai'!· Pere Ortin, 
"we must escape from the narrative prison of the colonial mentality, lose the privilege 
of discourse and change the grammar that dominates the production of almost all the 
narratives of the Western media". According to Ortin, "the images of certain 
international journalism, based on the multiple forms of human pain and suffering, are 
a sample of the cliches and misunderstandings that journalism inherits, without 
discussing them, from colonial ethnology. As they are easily recognizable by the 
average viewer, they are also potentially viral. That is why it is important for 
journalism to flee from pornomics ", says Ortin (Carrion, 20 19). 
Also according to the journalist resident in Ivory Coast Gemma Parellada, "stories that 
traditional media want to publish, even the newest and alternative media, are linked to 
drama. I wouldn 't just say conflicts, because conflicts have to be covered. But it 's not 
so much what as how the continent is treated and how these conflicts are dealt with. 
We stay in the more superficial versions, in that simplified st01y of heroes and villains: 
in Africa we have Jvfandelas and we have Pistorius. We have Joseph Kony, the rebel 
leaders, these terrible cannibalistic militiamen or the superheroes. It is as if there is 
nothing else between these extremes, as if there are no entrepreneurs, intellectuals, 
academics, artists ... 98 percent of societies. We eliminated a large part of the continent 
.fi·om the narrative and that is a ve1y clear way of violating the reality of the African 
continent " (Parellada, 20 19). 
So, in other words, if this kind of narrative about one's African identity is created by 
Western media defining, how does this affect Kenyans? What happens when a Kenyan-
African travels outside? The answer is that one is judged by the Western media 
stereotypes rather than for what one truly is. Is it possible to offer a different or 
complementary Africa identity to the tragedy usually represented in the visual media? 
Or can it only be represented as a humanitarian drama and pornography of the 
continent? 
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In this case, we consider that an extension of Kenyan photographic themes should be 
shown beyond the visual cliches offered by the national and international media. We 
believe that showing a greater number of positive realities and facts , photography can 
give a more hopeful identity to the Kenyan youth. 
Why Cartier-Bresson and Gabriel Marcel? 
We decide to study the figure of Cattier-Bresson because he is probably the most 
important photojournalist of the 20th century and the one who has influenced most 
other photographers. 
Coincidentally, Cartier-Bresson found the beginning of his photographic career in 1929 
during a journey through Africa with the image that- according to him- "is the only 
one that has influenced me. In I932, I saw a photograph of Martin Munkacsi in 
Tanganyika of three African children playing with a wave and I must say that the same 
photograph was the spark that set fire to the fireworks. Suddenly I understood that 
photography can fix eternity in a moment[. .. ] I couldn't believe it. Such a thing could 
be captured with the camera. Damn it, I took my camera and went out into the street" 
(Pogrebin, 2007) . 
Cattier-Bresson, enlightened by this visual reflection will try to capture the daily 
decisive moments of human life. He established a new way of looking and created new 
images of the world of the twentieth century that until then had not been documented 
in the history of photography. Cartier-Bresson will also be one of the fathers of what 
will later be called humanist photography. In other words, a type of photography that 
puts people at the center of the photographer, new after the disaster of the two world 
wars. In a way, this movement is based on humanism, surrealism and the ideologies of 
the beginning of the century, including existentialism as a search for meaning in the 
world. 
Finally, I decide to interpret photography with Gabriel Marcel's philosophical 
approach to the vittue of hope for several reasons. Gabriel Marcel is also French and a 
contemporary of Cartier-Bresson. As well as being a philosopher and a writer, Marcel 
worked as a journalist and was editor of the Pion publishing house in Paris. Therefore, 
his work is better related to artistic and photographic temperaments. Also because his 
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philosophy is based on a holistic vision of man. Marcel brings a pos.itive existentialism 
that eilhances hope unlike other existentialist philosophers of negation, who understand 
that the world as meaningless (such as Jean Paul Sartre or Albert Camus). 
We could have chosen classical philosophy following the Thomistic tradition 
represented, among others, by Josef Pieper, but we prefer to approach Cartier-
Bresson ' s photography from a less structured and more vitalist point of view. 
1.3) Problem Statement 
Whether the ethical elements of hope could be related to the photography of Cartier-
Bresson. 
1.4) Research Aim 
As a photojournalist, [ want to see whether is possible to combine Gabriel Marcel ' s 
existential ethics of hope with the new way of looking at the world introduced by the 
photography of Cartier-Bresson. In order to find the elements that could make it 
possible to show how photographers could enhance the virtue of hope in Kenyan youth 
rather than the dramatic visual stereotypes held by the Western media on Kenya (and 
Africa). 
1.5) Research Objectives 
I . To know the ethical characteristics of hope in Gabriel Marcel. 
2. To know the positive characteristics of humanist photography in Cartier-
Bresson. 
3. To see if it is possible to make a correspondence between the ethical 
characteristics of hope according to Gabriel Marcel and the photography of Cartier-
Bresson. 
1.6) Research Questions 
I . What are the characteristics of the ethics of hope in Gabriel Marcel? 
2. What are the positive characteristics of humanist photography in Cartier-
Bresson? 
3. What is the correspondence between the ethical characteristics of hope in 
Gabriel Marcel ' s philosophy and Cartier-Bresson' s photography? 
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L 7) Scope and limitations of the study 
The study is limit~d to research on hope according to Gabriel Marcel's philosophy and 
its application to Cartier-Bresson's photography using a heuristic method. 
1.8) Significance of the study 
This work will be valuable to show Western media (especially photography agencies 
such asAP, AFP, Reuters, EFE and photographic digital stores as Getty Images) that 
there is also a wider and more everyday photographic bet that combines a more plural 
and hopeful vision of Africa - and Kenya in p'articular - avoiding the continuous 
negative stereotyped repetition of the continent and its protagonists. [twill also teach 
that it is possible to show positive identification roles in and for Kenyan who learn 
through photography in the educational system. 
1.9) Definitions of key terms 
Hope. [t is a virtue by which we are presented as possible what we desire in the 
advancement of man over time. For Gabriel Marcel, hope is a virtue that requires a 
prior understanding of the existential meaning of the person in the world. For him hope 
is a mystery because it transcends every particular object. It is not a 'I hope that' but a 
'I hope' as a response to a trial, to a situation of captivity that is characterized by the 
impossibility "of accessing a certain lived fullness" (Urabayen, 200 l, p. 158). 
Photography. According to Cartier-Bresson "photography is putting the head, the eye 
and the heart in the same spotlight: the viewfinder" (Cartier-Bresson, 2016, p. I l ). 
"Photography is the recognition in reality of a rhythm of swface, lines and values,· all 
the camera has to do is print the decision of the eye on the film. A photo is seen in its 
entirety, at once as a picture; its composition is a simultaneous coalition, the organic 
coordination of visual elements. It is not composed free of charge and it is not possible 
to separate the backgroundfrom the form . Photography is a new plastic art, where one 
works in movement, in a kind of presentiment in life" (Cartier-Bresson, 1952, p. 15). 
Humanist photography . After the two world wars, a photographic movement arises that 
wishes to highlight the figure of the human being, as an attempt to dignify and revalue 
the dignity of the person. Thus, the person constitutes the center of the photographer' s 
image and concerns . These humanist concerns rank from a photograph that desires to 
capture the poetry of everyday life to a social photography oriented towards political 
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activism. Tre French photographers Henri Cartier-Bresson, Robert Doisneau and 
Willy Ronis are considered to be the founders of this movement which, iater on, from 
1967 was called Concerned Photography within photojournalism (although it was also 
extended to creative photography in general, especially among photographers born in 
Europe and North America) . 
International news agencies: they are journalistic organizations that collect news (texts, 
images, videos) from their correspondents in different places of their geographical area. 
These contents are immediately transmitted to the central office, where, after 
processing the information, they send it, as quickly as possible, to their clients (radios, 
newspapers, magazines, television stations or portals), known as subscribers. 
In shott, the agencies solve the need of the media and the public for a fast and complete 
informative coverage about an international event. "For agencies the measure oftheir 
influence is the number of media that feed on their services, while credibility is the 
basis of national and international expansion and the foundation of their business " 
(Muro, 2016, cap. 2). 
Stereotype: simplified perception of the reality of a fact, person or thing that seeks to 
justify a cettain behaviour in relation to a certain pre-judgment. Stereotypes are mental 
simplifications to achieve a situation of dominion over what is perceived. Media and 
agencies play an important role in the creation, repetition and maintenance of these pre-
judgments, since information demands celerity and these cliches (textual or visual) are 
assumed and disseminated aprioristically without any reflection. 
Pornomisery: is a concept that comes from Colombian cinema made in the 1970s and 
that is applied - by extension - to other narratives, such as the Media. Originally and 
still today, it expresses cinema that used poverty and human misery to make money 
and gain international recognition. 
The term 'pornomisety' was created by film director Luis Puenzo to criticize excesses 
in the representation of the marginality of Latin America cinema. Today it is also called 
'aesthetics of hunger'. In short, it is a spectacularization of poverty and marginality in 
the face of the opposite and neo-colonial discourse that highlights the exoticism of a 
specific country or culture (Leon, p. 77). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, let us carry out a general study of literature review gathering the diverse 
opinions expressed throughout history on the nature of the philosophy of hope and the 
nature of photography. 
2.1) Theoretical background 
In this dissertation we are going to make an approximation from the realistic philosophy 
to the existentialist philosophy of Gabriel Marcel and to the photography of Cartier-
Bresson. 
On the one hand, this realistic philosophy is the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition that 
defii1es hope as a human virtue. Virtue acquired through the struggle to acquire it as a 
habit, in 'status viatoris ', as Josef Pieper understands it (Pieper, 20 I 0). For Saint 
Thomas Aquinas, hope is also a vittue "that resides in the will " (Summa Theologiae, 
II-II q. 18 a. I) and that leads the person to deal with God the Creator. 
On the other hand, realistic philosophy follows the Platonic-Aristotelian distinction of 
the unity of human actions between 'poiesis' (Plat6n, El Banquete Vol III) and 
.'fronesis ' (Aristoteles, Etica a Nic6maco 1142 a) between the technical and the ethical. 
We will see how Gabriel Marcel perceives this unity of the technical together with the 
ethical. That is to say, action for being. The technical actions of my freedom can only 
be understood from the previous question of my existence: ·who am I? 
Gabriel Marcel considers that life is a mystery, not a problem. The person's being must 
be directed towards the hope that there is a creator who awaits us and is the way to 
achieve happiness. For Marcel -philosopher and playwright- life and art are good if 
they help us to improve our being. In this sense, art is also a means to understand the 
transcendental meaning of my existence and to help us improve as people on the road 
to happiness, because beauty brings us closer to asking ourselves about being. In short 
(Urabayen, 200 I), Marcel considers that philosophy serves man when it is a philosophy 
of hope in the Self. For Marcel means understanding: My own incarnation, my personal 
intimacy, my itinerancy in the world and my intersubjectivity with others. 
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These four pillars will help us to con~ider and analyze them in the phctographic work 
of another contemporary of Marcel, universal Frenchman and father of 
photojournalism: Cartier-Bresson. 
Henri Cartier-Bresson, founder of the Magnum Pictures agency, has been considered 
one of the three most influential photographers in history. Some have defined him as 
the eye of the centwy for his work on humanist photography on five continents. On the 
other hand, although Cattier-Bresson was not a philosopher with a theoretical body, he 
wrote a small work entitled The Decisive Moment in Photographing the Natural 
(Cartier-Bresson, 1952, p. 13). This work has had a great impact on photographic 
history and will also serve as a reference for this comparative study with Marcel. 
Finally, we will try to offer some conclusions about the parallelism between the two 
creators. 
In order to answer the questions posed, we will now define the concepts of hope, and 
the hope in Gabriel Marcel. We will do the same with the nature of photography, and 
the photography in Cattier-Bresson. 
2.2) Hope 
We will now look at 'the nature of hope' in three sections in order to understand the 
historical framework of this virtue in the history of philosophy that influenced even 
Gabriel Marcel. Subsequently, we will see in particular 'the nature of hope in Gabriel 
Marcel' according to the studies of several authors. 
2.2.1) On the nature of hope 
Influenced by a Christian cultural environment one might think that to ask hope is to 
ask a religious question . But to speak of it is not necessarily to ask a religious question . 
It is, without a doubt, an essentially philosophical question . 
Of the three great questions that Immanuel Kant ( 1724-1804) considered that 
philosophy had to answer, one of them is the question of hope. The first is : "What can 
I know?" The second: "What should I do? " And the third: "What can I expect?" (Kant, 
20 13). In other words, the sciences of gnoseology and ethics would be the answers to 
the first two questions. For the third question Kant does not establish an answer, but 
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we can intuit that to speak of hope means to ask :meself about eschatology within the 
I imits of reason. That is to say, hope supposes asking oneself the last questions. 
In shott, hope means speaking of the man who is moving along the path of life. And, 
likewise, living in time implies asking what l can expect on this path. In other words, 
if the path has or lacks a meaning for man's life, as hope precisely proposes, which is 
an 'expectation about something or someone' . 
We shall now look at three chapters related to hope in the history of philosophical ideas: 
the tragic meaning of the Greeks, the transcendental openness to Christianity and the 
denial of hope in God in modernity. 
In each of these three stages hope is considered different according to the consideration 
of the concept of time and the meaning of time itself, since the three ideas of hope, time 
and the meaning of time are intimately related. 
a) On the tragic meaning of Greek life 
We owe the relevant contributions to the history of ideas to the Greeks, because it was 
the Greeks who discovered rationality in nature . 
Until the 7th century BC, the Greeks lived the tragic fate imposed by the gods of 
Olympus, who inexorably marked the existential mission. In ancient times, every man 
- like Achilles or Ulysses - had a destiny to face. So as such, there is no hope in 
classical Greek antiquity, for there was only the destiny commanded by Olympus. 
From the 7th century B.C., pre-Socratic philosophers began to look for the last logical 
foundation of reality, because they discovered that nature has an orderly structure that 
it is possible to discover. Thus it is considered that philosophy was born with the 
Presocratics in Greece when this logos, reason, replaces myth. Therefore, the world has 
a meaning, a logos: it is no longer the absurd world without meaning under the destiny 
of the tyranny of gods and Greek myths. As Coraz6n (200 l, p. 4 7) points out for the 
pre-Socratic "rationality was inherent in reality. And reality has consistency in it, not 
from now on in strange or supernatural forces " of the Greek myths. 
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Thus, Anaximar:der of Miletus (6 I 0-545 BC) will consider ~hat the first principle or 
'arje ' of the nature of all material things is the 'ape iron '. And the 'ape iron ' is 
condemned to change, mutation and destruction in order to re-emerge cyclically again 
and again. In the same tune we find Heraclitus (540-480 BC), for whom the first 
principle of life is a fire that is in continuous motion. Everything flows, 'pant a rhei ', 
expressed in its well-known fragment (Heniclito, 1903, p. 503): "In the same rivers we 
enter and we do not enter, [for} we are and we are no longer [the same}". 
In addition to seeking those first principles of reality submitted to the becoming, the 
Greeks also observe the cyclical changes of nature (with the seasons, the rains, the 
stars). This will determine a circular vision of time, an eternal return of life that is in 
continuous movement with beings that are born, grow and die and regenerate again: 
the universe is a continuous becoming. 
For Aristotle (384-322 BC), as he develops Nicomachean Ethics, man must move in 
time in the search for perfection towards the good of the 'arete ' (virtue), developing 
his ow.n human nature. In this sense, man's hope is like a natural anticipation of the 
possible to come, but the stagirite understands that man towards good must overcome 
fear in the movement of time . "There must still be some hope of salvation to fight for. 
And one sign of this is that fear causes us to deliberate, while no ~me deliberates over 
desperate things " (Ret6rica, 1383 to 5). That is to say, where there is human hope it 
will be because there is fear and we must wait only for what is feasible. 
On the other hand, Aristotle observes the evolution of human life by comparing natural 
hope in the different stages of life: "[Young people} most of the time five full of hope, 
since hope concerns the future , while remembrance concerns the past: young people 
have much future and little past; and it is certainly not proper of the first day to 
remember nothing, but to expect eve1ything. For the same reason that has just been 
said, they are also easy to deceive (since they are easily filled with hope), they have the 
most courageous spirit " (Etica a Nic6maco, Ill, 3, 1389 to 18-27). On the other hand, 
the old "five more for remembrance than for hope, because they have little left of life 
and, on the other hand, much lived and, for their part, hope resides in the future, while 
remembrance settles in the past, "Aristotle points out (ibid, III , 3, 1390 to 7-8). 
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According to the Epicureans, man's nature consists in reaching a serene e;(pectation or 
ataraxy (absence of disturbance) between the life of the body and that of the soul. The 
man concentrated on himself is for pleasure, avoiding the fear of the gods of Olympus. 
The poet Horatio (65-27 BC), points out that the meaning of life is to enjoy the present 
carpe diem: "Be prudent, drink good wine and reduce long hopes to the short space of 
existence. As we speak, the envied hour flees. Seize the day, do not trust in tomorrovv " 
(Odas, I, 11 , 8). 
On the other hand, the Stoics faced the fatality of the world, accepting the principle of 
resignation in the face of pain and suffering in life through the firmness ofthe will. For 
Marcus Aurelius ( 121-180): "In the universe change; in life firmness" (Meditaciones, 
I, 16). For this reason, Seneca ( 4-65) considers that "the greatest hindrance of life is 
the expectation of tomorrow and the loss oftoday" (La brevedad de Ia vida, 9) . In short, 
Stoicism considers hope more of a vain passion than as a virtue to be attained. 
In summary, in the world of the Greeks time is considered circular, in continuous 
movement and in eternal return. As such, there is a simple human hope in the face of 
the fatalism of the tragic destiny of life. A life that we must fight against the 
hopelessness of fear (Aristotle), enjoy it in pleasure (epicureans) or resign ourselves to 
the inevitable (stoics). 
b) On the transcendent sense of !tope 
With the advent of Christ into the world, it introduces a transcendent sense into history 
where God is Alpha and Omega, beginning and end. Thus, one passes from a circular 
conception of the Greeks to a linear conception oftime and history, from the beginning 
ofthe creation ofthe world to the Last Judgment. The simply natural and fatalistic hope 
of the Greeks now becomes a theological virtue with Christianity, for God reveals to 
man that hope consists in setting out with virtue and grace to embrace his creator. Time 
on earth becomes - can become - a path with meaning. According to Augustine of 
Hippo (354-430), it is a pilgrimage from the city of men on earth to the City of God in 
heaven (La ciudad de Dios, 20 17). 
This paradigm shift in the sense of time and history implies that a human being now 
has a personal biography that begins and ends . Moreover, time also has a double 
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dimens·:on when Augustine asks in his autobiography the Confessions: "What, then, i1 
time? If no one asks m~. I know; but if I want to explain it to the one who asks me, I 
don't know. What I do say without hesitation is that I know that if nothing happened, 
there ·would be no time past; and if nothing happened, there would be no future time; 
and (f nothing existed, there would be no present time[ .. .} I measure time, I know it; 
but I do not measure the future, which is not yet; I do not measure the present, which 
does not extend into any space; nor do I measure the past which no longer exists. What, 
then, do I measure?" (XI, XIV, 17-33). And he replied: "In you, my soul, I measure 
the times. In you, I repeat, I measure the times. The affection that is produced in you 
by things that happen, and which, even when they have happened, remain" (XI, XXVI I, 
36). 
That is to say, the saint of Hippo considers 'time' with a double perspective: time has 
an objective chronological dimension, but also a subjective dimension, because it is 
measured in function of the impact that some actions of life imprint on our life. Human 
beings have different perceptions of time - slow or fast, suffering or joyful, with 
nostalgia or hatred - depending on the different experiences. So, "although St. 
Augustine does not expressly develop, it follows that what allows us to live in time is 
that we are incarnate spirits. Therefore, there is only time where there is an incarnate 
spirit" (Isler, 2008, p. 198). 
Tomas de Aquino ( 1225-1274) uses fides et ratio (man revealed as 'imago Dei ' and the 
contributions of Aristotelian rationality) to analyze the virtue of hope in Summa 
Theologiae. Aquinas explains that the meaning of man's life is to love: "to love is to 
desire good fi·om someone" (Summa Theologiae, l-2, q. 26, a. 4, c). And hope is 
defined as the desire impressed by God in the heart of every man to attain the highest 
good of God. Let us go in pat1s. St. Thomas says: 
a) "Hope is virtue, for it makes man's action good, and conforms to the right 
rule [in natural reason and to God himse!j]. The hope of which we speak is a habit" 
(Summa Theologiae, II-II q. 17 a.l). 
b) The subject of hope is the will to seek God. "Hope resides in the higher 
[intellectual} appetite, called the will" (Summa Theologiae, II-II q . 18 a. 1). 
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c) The object of hope is to reach the creator. "Is eternal bliss the object of hope? 
The proper and principal object of hope is eternal bliss. The hope that we try to reach 
God by relying on his help in order to obtain the expected good, " Aquinas points out 
(Summa Theologiae, ll -II , q. 17, a. 2). 
d) Four conditions ofthe object oftrue hope: "First, let it be good; for, properly 
speaking, there is no hope but good. Second, let it be future, for hope does not refer to 
the present good already possessed. And in this hope is distinguishedfromjoy, which 
refers to the present good. Thirdly, it must be an arduous thing that is achieved with 
difficulty, for it is not said that someone expects a minimum thing when it is in his 
power to obtain it immediately. [. .. }Fourth, that this arduous object be possible to 
obtain, for no one expects what is absolutely unattainable. And in this hope is 
distingztishedji·om despair " (Summa Theologiae, U-11, q. 40, a. 1, a). We will see how 
these four points relate to the existential characteristics in Gabriel Marcel. 
e) Finally, for Aquinas, the relationship between the virtues of loving God 
(charity) and seeking God (hope) consists in the fact that "charity sufficiently perfects 
the will as to the act ofloving; but another virtue is required to perfect it in the act of 
waiting" (Summa Theologiae, II-II q. 18 a. I ad. 2). 
A follower of Thomism, Josef Pieper ( 1904-1997), will develop hope in his work Las 
virtudes jimdamentales by making an interesting contribution between man in 'status 
viatoris ' and man in 'status comprenhensoris ' (20 10, p. 358). 
"Viator means the one who is on the way, and 'status viatoris ', the state of being who 
is on the way. The opposite concept corresponding to the 'status viatoris' is the 'status 
comprehensoris '. The one who has captured, achieved, reached, is no longer viator, 
but comprehensor [. . .} To be on the way, to be viator, means to walk towards 
happiness; to have reached, to be comprehensor, means to possess happiness. With the 
word happiness, however, one understands first of all the objective jitllness in the order 
of being. And this fullness is the beatific vision of God'- for this reason, Pieper points 
out that- "The sense of the 'status viatoris ' is the status comprehensor" (ibid, p. 361 ). 
We will see later on this idea in the work of Gabriel Marcel in dealing with open time 
and closed time ( 'the time to be ' and 'the time to have' in Marcel's words) . 
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Man, logically, has the possibility- being free- of not followir.g the good impressed 
in his nature, despairing or not living the vittue of hope, which Pieper defines as the 
"ultimum potentiae, the maximum to which man can aspire, that is, the fullness of 
human power" (ibid, p. 361 ). 
Pieper also notes the distinction between natural and supernatural hope. "Natural hope 
arises from man 's youthful energy and is exhausted with it" (ibid, p. 376) while hope 
is, first and foremost, a theological vittue, 'for hope is either a theological virtue or it 
is not at all a virtue. It is a virtue only because of what it is a theological virtue " (ibid, 
p. 365) because God has revealed to man that he is his Father and that the son can meet 
him on the earthly pilgrimage. 
Thus, while "every hope tells us: 'it will end well, it will have a good end '; 
Supernatural hope assures us: the man who is really in God's grace will end in an 
infinitely better way than he could hope for,· this man's end will be nothing less than 
Eternal Life " (ibid, p. 26). 
Moreover, paradoxically Pieper reminds us of the idea that with the passing of the 
years, natural human hopes diminish and interest in life is lost. "As man declines, 
natural hope tires, for it becomes heavy. And yet in supernatural hope - anchored in 
God- the opposite happens: not only is it not linked to natural youth, but it bases a 
much more essential youth. It gives man a 'not yet ' that completely triumphs over the 
decline of the natural energies of hope. It gives man 'so much future' that the past of 
the longest and richest life appears, on the contrary, as 'little past"' (ibid, p. 376). 
Pieper also points to the error of atheistic existentialist philosophy "which considers 
human existence as 'being for death' [ . .] by conceiving the existence of man as 
essentially 'at the root of his temporal being' (Heidegger). And he does not realize the 
true nature of his object " (ibid, p. 362). That is to say, the existentialism of Heidegger 
and Sartre considers time as an end in itself and not as a means to satisfy the fullness 
of man with a possible God Creator Father, who as such does not exist for them. 
For Pieper, the man who in 'status viatoris' experiences being essentially a creature, 
the "being who is not yet " of his own existence, cannot fall into despair, 'for the 
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meaning of created existence is not nothing, but being, that is, truth" (ibid, p. 365). 
Man wants to know - as Aristotle intuited - and the truth r~vealed later is this : we are 
'imago Dei'. 
Well, perhaps we can still consider that transcendental existential hope is something 
abstract or ethereal, and not something real as Marcel will consider it. To what could 
we resemble it after what was said in Aquinas and Pieper? 
According to the poet and convert Charles Peguy ( 1873-1914) hope is like a child. 
"Hope - in the midst of its two elder sisters, faith and charity gives the sensation of 
allowing oneself to be dragged along like a child who had no strength to walk ... . But 
in reality it is hope that makes the other two walk [as it is the child who makes the 
parents walk]. And it is it that makes the whole world walk, because in truth [as the 
parents} one only works for the children and the two greatest of faith and charity 
advance thanks to the little one " (Lorda, 2013, p. 136). It is this child - the virtue of 
theological hope - that encourages man to walk in his life. 
In sh01t, Christianity brings a full existential sense, which the Greeks had lacked. 
According to Augustine, Aquinas and Pieper, hope is no longer a simple natural waiting 
in a tragic world with gods on Olympus. Hope is now a supernatural virtue that reminds 
man that we are called to live as children in search of God the Creator Father. 
c) The darkening of transcendental hope 
Rene Descartes ( 1596-1650) initiated the anthropological turn of the cog ito ergo sum 
that culminated in the 18th century Enlightenment. Now, the autonomy of the person 
is defended towards any transcendental reference in the sense of life and hope will now 
be an autonomous hope in man, without any transcendental reference (as Aquinas and 
the medieval Scholastica had proposed). The enlightened must find the true man, who 
belongs to Hellenic culture, the culmination of the perfect man. 
Thus Friedrich Nietzsche ( 1844-1900) deals with the subject of hope, turning to the 
Greek myth of Pandora which- like Eve in the Judea-Christian religion- represents 
the perdition of humanity. Pandora was the first woman created by the god Zeus to 
punish Prometheus, who had given fire to men. Until then the world had lived in 
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harmony but Pandora opened the amphora that contain~d the evils and liberated all the 
misfortunes, letting the evils flood the earth. According to the myth, Zeus asked 
Pandora to seal the vessel again . By the time Pandora closed the amphora, the only 
thing she already had inside was hope, so humans did not receive it. From this myth 
comes the expression 'open Pandora 's box' and 'hope is the last thing to be lost '. 
According to Nietzsche, since then human beings have kept the amphora and we live 
thinking of the wonder of hope kept when, in reality, this amphora only contained the 
evils. In other words, Nietzsche's criticism of his contemporaries with regard to hope 
is the fact that men become passive in the face of reality and only yearn for stored 
dreams, forgetting the real action in this world. The Christian hope that is "a morality 
of slaves" (Nietzsche, 1973, p. 163) longs for a God who has died and "hope is the 
worst of evils because it prolongs the torment of men" (Nietzsche, 1986, p. 80). 
On the other hand, transcendental hope must be replaced by the idea of progress. 
Scientific reason is the only reason that will allow us to live in "the best of possible 
worlds " (Leibniz, 1875, p. 606), according to the theodicy of the German thinker. But, 
as we know, hope in this perennial progress of Humanity - where man was simply a 
being thrown into the world of existentialism- led to the negative monsters of reason: 
such as nuclear war and the concentration camps of the 20th century, confirming the 
thesis that if reason is autonomous, "if God does not exist, everything is permitted" 
(Dostoievski, 2000, p. 941 ). 
"All of us have ·witnessed how progress can turn into terrible progress in evil. If 
technical progress does not correspond to progress in the ethical formation of man, 
·with the growth of the inner man, it is not progress but a threat to man and to the 
world" (Vatican, 1965, pt. 22). 
Paradoxically it was also Friedrich Nietzsche who pointed out that "he who has 
something to live for, is able to bear any how " ( 1988, p. 116). And as psychiatrist 
Viktor Frankl ( 1905-1997) noted about his stay in Auschwitz: "There is much "visdom 
in Nietzsche when he points to that phrase. Woe to him who saw no meaning in his l[fe, 
no goal, no intentionality and, therefore, no purpose in living it. That one was lost [in 
the concentration camp]. And I would dare to say that there is nothing in the world 
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capable of helping us survive, even in the worst conditions, such os knowing that life 
has meaning" (Frankl, 1962, p. 168). 
For Viktor Frankl it is only possible to have hope when there is a meaning to life. And 
a sense of life when there is hope. But where does it come from that there is or must be 
followed a sense of life? 
Philosopher CS Lewis points out that man is like a fleet of ships to a destination ( 1996, 
p. 87) and American philosopher Peter Kreeft ( 1989, p. 9) comments that "they must 
know why the fleet is at sea in the first place. What is their mission, their destination? 
This is the question of the summum bonum, and no modern philosophers except the 
existentialists seem even to be interested in this, the greatest of all questions " [. .. } And 
concludes Kreeft: "I think I know why modern philosophers dare not raise this greatest 
ofquestions: because they have no answer to it. It is a hole so big that only the courage 
of an existentialist or the faith of a theist can fill it " (ibid, p. 9). 
In other words, it is precisely the theists and existentialists (among them Marcel in his 
own way and whom we will study) who attempt to answer the basic question 
considered in modernity by Martin Heidegger ( 1889-1976): "Why is there anything 
rather than nothing? " (1942, p. 22). I mean·, why I'm here. According to the German 
thinker and rector of Freiburg, "Many men never encounter this question, if by 
encounter we mean not merely to hear and read about if as an interrogative 
formulation but to ask the question, that is, to bring if about, to raise it, to feel its 
inevitability. And yet each of us is grazed at least once, perhaps more than once, by the 
hidden power of this question, even if he is not aware of what is happening to him. The 
question looms in moments of great despair [. .. ]It is present in moments of rejoicing, 
upon us in boredom[. .. } This the question 'Why is there anything rather than nothing?' 
may be asked expressly, or, unrecognized as a question, it may merely pass through 
our lives like a brief gust of wind" (Heidegger cited in Kreeft, 1989, p. 9). 
On the other hand, among the theists we can consider the comment of the German 
theologian Joseph Ratzinger in pointing out that "if the world had no meaning, we 
[men] could not create it either. Men can pe1jorm actions that mean something within 
a practical framework, but never give meaning to a life. Meaning exists or does not 
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e,:cist. People do not invent, but find, " adds Ratzinger (2005, p. 171 ). That is to say, 
man does not create, he cannot give himself his own instruction manual. In other words, 
the designed one could not give himself his own rules. The designed implies a previous 
external designer who gives the instruction manual to what has been created. 
From this perspective, the magisterium of the Church has no sense of life, as if it had a 
key to the vehicle of pilgrims traveling from the city of men to the city of God. No. 
What Aquinas and Pieper's human/Christian philosophy recalls, along with the so-
called Church tradition, is even more radical and natural. The encyclical Gaudium et 
:.pes puts it this way: "In the depths of his conscience, man detects a law which he does 
not impose upon himself, but which holds him to obedience. Always summoning him to 
love good and avoid evil, the voice of conscience when necessary speaks to his heart: 
do this, shun that. For man has in his heart a law written by God; to obey it is the ve1y 
dignity of man; according to it he will be judged. Conscience is the most secret core 
and sanctumy of a man. There he is alone with God" (Vatican, 1965, pt. 16). 
Therefore, Ratzinger points out, "what the Church says is that meaning is not a human 
product, but given by God" (2005 , p. 171). In other words: the rules of navigation, the 
meaning of life is inscribed in man's own heart by a Creator God. And each man can 
disco'Jer the meaning of his own biography by listening to the inner voice of the 
conscience imprinted on his heart. Man is 'imago Dei', and thanks to his creator he can 
find a horizon of his life to the existential itinerary. A note: to discover this awareness 
is a matter; to live virtue and to have hope is another matter. But as we already 
announced with Nietzsche: "He who has a why to live can bear almost any how." 
In other words, the only thing the Church can do is to defend the conscience printed 
with the instruction manual of human nature, but it will never give rules or an 
existential meaning to man. As John Henry Newman ( 180 1-1890) pointed out, the 
obligation of theists in the Church is to defend conscience. "If any Pope spoke against 
conscience, in the true sense of the word, he would be committing a suicidal act. That 
Pope would be cutting the grass under his feet. His authentic mission is to proclaim the 
moral Law and to protect and strengthen that Light [of conscience] which enlightened 
eve1y man who came into the world. The Pope 's theoretical authority, as well as his 
power in practice, is based on the Law of Conscience and its sacredness " (ibid, p. 76). 
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And Newma'l concluded: "And [f I am forced to speak of religion in an after-dinner 
toast, l will gladly drink 'Fo;· the Pope '. But first 'For the conscience! ', then 'For the 
Pope!"' (Newman, 1996, p. 82) . 
According to the philosopher and anthropologist Rene Girard (1923-20 15), in today's 
world- which has blinded the transcendence of the hope etsi Deus non daretur (as if 
god did not exist) - there is the risk of going back centuries to the fatalism of the 
Greeks. "We should ask the question about the importance of religion in a completely 
different way than the media do today. In the view of the mass media, religion is 
conceived as a thought alien to human nature, something that comes as a constriction, 
something that can be harmful to health. Religion damages man like smoke. But this 
discourse omits the fact that religion is part of human nature, it is consubstantial to 
human nature to have religious beliefs, and as such it must have an anthropological 
and social purpose, and we must ask ourselves what it means to live in a world in 1;11hich 
religion is pretended to be dispensed with". And Girard asks himself: "Is this not a 
danger, in particular the danger of the unleashing of violence? [. . .] if our world is a 
world in which tragedy is returning, if we begin to see this tragedy as a religious 
tragedy, then there is hope; if instead we consider it a Greek tragedy, then it is over " 
(Girard, 20 ll, p. 44 ). Avoiding a return to Greek tragedy and fatalism, recovering a 
hope with transcendent meaning, is something that we will see in Gabriel Marcel. 
In short, we end this epigraph by answering the first question asked at the beginning of 
this chapter by Kant: "What can we expect today? And what can we not expect? Above 
all, we must note that cumulative progress is only possible in the material [. . .] On the 
other hand, in the realm of ethical conscience and moral decision, there is no similar 
possibility of increase. In other words, it is not science that redeems man. Man is 
redeemed by love. We need to have hopes- larger or smaller- that keep us going day 
by day. But without the great hope, which has to surpass everything else, those are not 
enough. This great hope can only be God", says the Encyclical Gaudium et spes ( 1965, 
pt. 24-31 ). 
In short, man discovers who he is and what he is in conscience. I am an incarnated man 
(Marcel, 1964 ), a spirit in the time (Polo, 1991 ). But- according to Marcel -I am son 
of God first of all. And it is only by following our printed conscience of children of 
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God that we can love a'ld have true hope. And as Blaise Pascal points out in his 
Pensees: "I would rather make a mistake by believing in a God who does not exist than 
make a mistake by not believing in a God who exists. For if there is nothing afterwards, 
obviously I will never know it when I sink into eternal nothingness; but if there is 
something, if there is Someone, I will have to account for my attitude of rejection " 
(2008, p. 277). In other words, man's itinerancy is hope in love while we love others, 
for "at the end of life we will be examined for love". And as Marcel points out about 
hope "to love a person is to tell him: you will not die " ( 1964, p. 4 72) . 
2.2.2) On the nature of hope in Gabriel Marcel according to several authors 
Having analyzed the evolution of the concept of hope in the history of philosophy, let 
us now look very briefly at a synthesis of the particular characteristics of hope m 
Gabriel Marcel , according to eleven authors of Marcel: 
According to Julia Urabayen (2001), Marcel ' s anthropology is neither a systematic nor 
a closed philosophical system. Not even his works present a classification or a list of 
conditions on existence. The different conditions of existence are born of Marcel ' s 
reflection that the self is living in the Europe of scientism, the belle epoque or the world 
wars. Thus, in his works, Marcel exposes a deepening of the existential security of the 
person from a double method: from the access to beings (according to ontology and the 
investigation of metaphysical conditions) and from the perspective of beings (from the 
phenomenological analysis). For Marcel, access to being is made from the access of 
specific beings. 
According to the professor of Navarre, the metaphysical conditions of man that 
characterize the existence of Gabriel Marcel's hope are the encounter with: "one 's own 
personal incarnation, itinerancy in the world, the discovery of my intimacy and 
intersubjectivity with others" (U rabayen, 200 l, p. 259). These are going to be the four 
essential characteristics that we are going to develop in our essay and for the application 
to Cartier-Bresson's photographic work. 
On the other hand, for Marcel, hope is active, not passive. This would consist in 
affirming that there is a mysterious principle at the heatt of being that is in collusion 
with me, with my own incarnation and existence. Hope is a knowledge beyond non-
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knowledge. It is a gift and a mystery, since it is a knowledge granted that would be a 
grace, but that cannot be understood in any way as a conquest (Several , 1995). 
For this reason, Jolin and McCormick ( 1973) in Tragic Wisdom and Beyond point out 
that this active hope is a will not only for us, but is a gift that is exposed for others. 
There can be hope not only through one us and for ourselves, but in open service to 
men. 
John G. Messerly is interested in that function of existential hope in time, that is, 
itinerancy. Hope needs to be tested in despair. The first guarantees fidelity by 
overcoming despair and gives us the strength to grow continually. Thus, although 
existential analysis highlights that the basis of hope is found in a situation that invites 
'to despair', hope will consist in overcoming despair (Messerly, 20 14). 
Jill Graper Hernandez argues that hope can be understood existentially on the basis of 
what it means to be human, without naive optimism. According to this author from the 
University of Texas, the hope offered to us by Gabriel Marcel is not optimism, but the 
creation of ways for us to flourish personally in our intimacy, pointing out that poverty 
or absolute dependence on technology are real life evils that can stifle our hope (Graper 
Hernandez, 20 II). 
The philosopher JosefPieper also stresses that the answer cannot be man's presumption 
or despair. This is in 'status viatoris ' and the meaning of existence cannot be nothing, 
but to reach the being of existence, that is to say, the truth about its meaning in the 
world, the 'status comprehensoris '. Pieper tries to answer from this perspective to the 
heideggerian question of "Why is there anything rather than nothing? and am I 
something between two nothingness?" (Heidegger, 1942, p. 22)]. The man on the road 
with his intimacy discovers that hope is towards love for others and for God, origin, 
'imago Dei ' (Pieper, 20 I 0, p. 359). 
Godfrey analyzes the thesis that the French philosopher found in 1942 as the best 
formulation of hope that supposes a hope: "1 hope in you for a being in us " (Godfrey 
J.J ., 1987, p. 103). Existence and hope would be united hand in hand, since both are 
ontologically related, as Ricour helped to concretize in his encounters with Marcel. 
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For Simonne Plourde, suffering presents itself a·; an order that we must overcome in 
order to keep our being. This author points out that love- beyond death- is the place 
for hope against all hope in us. An idea that as we know Marcel expressed in Homo 
Viator in the famous sentence of loving is to point out that "you will not die" (Plourde, 
2005, p. 575). 
According to Canas, Marcel ' s first encounters with Sartre show the Christian origins 
that both had in their works with a Christian anthropological formation . According to 
this author, Marcel continued to live on hope, while Sartre abandoned himself. In short, 
Canas maintains that Sartre chose the absurd when he pointed out that 'hell is others' .. . 
whereas for Marcel people have open relations of intersubjectivity. However, this 
article concludes that we cannot fall into the topic 'Marcel believer ' and 'Sartre atheist' 
(Canas, 2005 , p. 392). 
Time is currently an empty space, without hope, for the Korean philosopher Byung-
Chul Han unlike Marcel. According to the Korean author, in post-modernity, narrative 
time- atticulated and sustained by a sense- has given way to an atomized time, where 
all moments are equal to each other, since there is no sense that allows us to distinguish 
or prioritize them. The short term banishes the long term, thus favoring the 
predominance of a fragmented present, empty of duration, which is reduced to current 
peaks. It is an accelerated time, but without direction . In other words, there is no hope. 
(Byung-Chul Han, 2015 , p. 13). 
2.2.3) Summary 
According to these authors, a philosophy of existence in hope is based on these four 
points: the incarnation, in time, the development of one' s own personal intimacy; and 
dealing with others. For Gabriel Marcel, each person must ask himself about his 
existential meaning in the world in aviator state. 
Man must understand that hope is fragile, humble, and must be asked to fight against 
despair. The weapon to conquer is to love. To love the other is to live with hope; it is 
to be able to say "you will not die" in us (Plourde, 2005, p. 575). In short, these 
Marcelian ideas, we will try to apply them analogically to Cartier-Bresson ' s 
photography. 
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Finally, we can point out that Gabriel Marcel completes wit!1 other words- but with 
the same background- the ethical importance of human development that wc.s already 
announced and defended by the Greek-Christian humanist tradition. This tradition 
pointed out that we of Marcel in the social nature of the man pointed out by Aristotle 
in the Nicomachean Ethics. 
For both Aristotelian-Thomist ethics and for Marcel, man must develop through the 
virtue of his own nature, in his incarnation, in time itinerancy towards his own end -
of his 'imago Dei' intimacy- in order to attain happiness in others and their creator. 
2.3) Photography 
After studying hope, we are now going to see m three sections 'the nature of 
photography' in general, in order to understand the professional framework in which 
the photographer Cartier-Bresson moved. Later, in the next chapter, we will see 
particularly 'the nature of photography in Cartier-Bresson' according to the perception 
of several authors. 
2.3.1) On the nature of photography 
The word photography comes from the Greek to write with light. The light is in a 
concrete time in a concrete moment. We could say that light 2.nd time are the two 
essential raw materials for taking photographs. 
The photographic medium was born with the aura of capturing objective reality in 1838 
in Paris. Since then this art has multiplied exponentially: today photography has 
become ubiquitous and we have cameras that capture everything. Nothing escapes the 
voracity of the vigilant gaze of the Orwellian Big Brother who wants to equal the all-
seeing eye uf God. Even in 1932 the writer Marius Gifreda (p. 28) predicted that ''there 
will come a day when the Zeiss lens will surpass the Zeus eye, which sees everything .. . 
but from too high up". 
Let us now analyze three points about the nature of photography: a) truth and 
photographed representation; b) photography and intentionality, and c) the technical 
and ethical dimension of photography. 
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a) Truth and photographed representation 
The question of the nature of photography makes us place the distinction between 
reality and representation. 
In Plato 's Republic (s. V BC), the arts try to capture the reality of the sensitive world, 
which is a copy of the world of ideas. "For Plato, the idea of art is a betrayal of the 
idea, because the sensitive object is stiff a copy of his idea. In reality, the artist copies 
a copy of the idea, not the real idea," says Alexander Nehamas (2004), professor of 
philosophy at Princeton University. Criticism is simple. 
From this perspective, by making a copy of the copy, photographers today would 
simulate a fiction for Plato. As we know, the disciple of Socrates did not trust either 
poets or artists for the education of youth (and probably would not trust photographers 
today ... ) since none knows how to distinguish between the reality of the sensitive world 
and the ideas of the intelligible world. Only philosophers are able to make this 
distinction and to guide youth. 
With the invention of photography in 1838, photography was conceived to represent 
the same reality in a scientistic and positivist era. The image is the captured reality. The 
function of the camera was to faithfully reflect reality and, nevertheless, we can the 
phrase attributed to Mark Twain about the deception: "There are three types of lies: 
lies, damn lies, and statistics, " because something similar about statistics happens with 
the camera. When we think of the camera as the notary of the truth about reality, the 
camera lies, although many people think that the camera does not lie, and that all 
photography is always evidence of the true identity of something or someone. Let's 
look at an example. 
The first photograph taken by Daguerre in 1838 in Paris is a panoramic view of the 
Boule bard du Teple Street, of which two shots of the same location are preserved on 
the same day: 
I) In the first shot only a few buildings appear through a window. 
2) A second shot shows the same buildings but with a shoeshine boy and a client 
at work. What happens in these two shots to avoid capturing the hustle and bustle of 
life, the wagons, the markets and the crooks of nineteenth-century Paris? 
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The an:>wer is obvious: at that moment, given the sensitivity of the camera, an exposu{e 
of at least fifteen minutes was required to fix someone mobile between the buildings. 
With such a long time, any person or object in motion vanished, as it appears in the 
first shot. But we know from the second shot that a shoeshine boy and his client were 
used as occasional extras to stay that necessary time in the street and be able to be 
represented in the image. 
This episode about the two shots adds two reflections to the history of photography: 
the use of the camera fails in its attempt to capture living reality; only by deceiving can 
a certain truth be reached. In other words, historical truth does not coincide with the 
perceived truth photographed. 
Therefore, although the raw material of photography is reality, the images are not 
reality itself, but an interpretation of reality made by the photographer. For the 
philosopher and documentary filmmaker Jose Manuel Navia "photography is a 
language that speaks to us of the world, but in no case is it a reliable copy of reality. 
Photography belongs to the world, but it is not the same world. In other words, the only 
reality of photography is the photograph itself [itself: on paper or screen]" (Navia, 
20 I 0, p. 337). 
In this sense we can also say that "photography is - before anything else - a way of 
looking. It is not the look itself", has pointed out the writer and essayist Susan Sontag 
( 1996, p. 213 ). This means that when we go to see the exhibition of a photographer-
for example that of the British photographer Martin Parr of Magnum Pictures- we are 
not going to see the reality of England, but England seen under the eyes of the 
photographer Mattin Parr. The important thing is not reality, but how Mattin Parr sees 
reality. This is the point. 
Similarly, it happens with painting. For art critic E. H. Gombrich (2013, p. 119): "I do 
not ask myself how we see the world, but how we see the paintings ... But curiously we 
see a painting as if it were the world". For Gombrich, the perception of images must 
be something different from our perception of reality. 
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Critic Jon Fontcuherta points out that appearances have also replaced truth in the 
representation of Judas ' kiss to Christ. In the Passion scene, photographic realism hides 
treason in a kiss. The appearance of the kiss to Christ seems to be one of love, but the 
intention is to give it to the Romans. This is also the drama in photography. 
In short, once agam, the true reality is different from the truth perceived and 
represented. "It was not until the advent of digital technology that not only the 
specialists, but also the profane, the general public in short, discovered the inevitable 
manipulation that operates in the process of any photographic image. Perhaps we are 
witnessing the death of photography. Following the biblical simile one could speak 
more properly of his crucifixion. Because in this case, too, it is a painful but 
indispensable requirement for a resurrection. In the myste1y of redemption, Judas' kiss 
was ajiilly justified gesture that opened the door to salvation. We are not sure whether 
the 'new photograph', the post-photography, saves or condemns the old photograph, 
but it certainly places us in a convenient position to x-ray the world in which we are " 
(F ontcuberta, 20 I 0, p. I 0). 
Therefore, we must be careful not to fall into the trap of photography as a public notary 
of reality (which is and has been the greatest trick of photography since its birth in the 
nineteenth century as a way of documenting society), when photographers such as 
Atget walked the Parisian boulevards trying to make a scientific inventory of the streets, 
markets and places of leisure. 
In short, although photography was initially perceived as a document, we have tried to 
show that photography lies. Photography does not capture the same reality, nor does it 
capture, nor can it capture the essence of beir.g and being in the world, but only the 
appearances of the world. That is to say, with photography we can only represent, but 
not show the truth in all its extension. 
So, it is impossible to apply the phrase of the Spanish poet Antonio Machado (2003 , p. 
54) to photography about the search for truth when he says: "Your truth? No, the /ruth 
and come with me to seek it. Yours, keep it". 
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No. We cannot apply Machad•)'s truth to the truth photographed, because we are not 
seeing the 'veritas ', we are representing the perceived truth, not the ontological truth. 
And the truth perceived is different for each photographer and - even though the raw 
material of reality is the same - it can be perceived from different points of view 
depending on the background, the person or the vital circumstances of the 
photographer. [n other words, we can say that so many men, so many looks, so many 
photographers. That is to say, the truth is polyhedral. The truth photographed has 
several accesses. We can also say that there are different glances in everyday life on 
the same fact. What is important - once again - is not simply reality, but how the 
photographer sees reality. 
Making an analogy, we point to journalist Peter Seewald's question to Pope Joseph 
Ratzinger: "How many ways are there to reach God [the sum truth]? As many as men, " 
answered Ratzinger (1996, p. 37). So, how many ways are there to get the reality? As 
many as photographers. 
As Etienne Gilson points out in Painting and Reality (2000, p. I 05), the work of the 
artist (or the photographer, although many photographers do not consider themselves 
artists) is a creative work, insofar as the work involves "defining a being [of reality], 
putting it aside, abstracting it and producing it". Also, the good of art for Gilson does 
not consist in trying to tell the truth, nor in promoting moral perfection, but in pursuing 
the good of the perfection of the created work (in this case, the image photographed as 
such), which lies in reaching the fullness of its own identity, through beauty. 
b) Photography and intentionality 
For the critic and semiologist Roland Barthes, photography is a promise. For Barthes, 
every image remains when the person dies and, consequently, "photography says of 
something that has been " (1990, p. 149). This would mean that "if we photograph it is 
to attach ourselves to the instants of life, in such a way that we forget that death exists," 
according to some critic F ontcuberta (20 I 0, p. 22). 
On the other hand, a different conception is that of the photographer Siegfried Kracauer 
(2008), who affirms that "photography destroys when it portrays ... and the traits of 
men are only conserved in their history: the human being is not the one who appears 
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[simply] in his photograph, but the sum of that which can be extracted from him [and 
which we do not see in the photograph J" (p. 13 7). 
Paradoxically, beyond the content of opposing ideas, another debate is now centered 
on technique and not on the ends of nature. 
There are more and more new cameras on the market with higher resolution and quality 
in a savage ' technological Darwinism' . And it is true that, although without a camera 
one cannot photograph, the camera has no freedom . The camera is not a living being. 
The camera does not have a weltanschauung. Only the man behind the photographic 
body can give an intentionality, a sense to the perceived reality. 
That is why, as the father of nature photography, Ansel Adams, points out: "the most 
important component of a camera is the 30 em behind it ". The most important thing is 
not the camera, nor the brand, but the eye. And the best team bears the signature of 
neither Canon, nor Nikon, nor Leica, but the photographer's gaze when he checks the 
human condition with the help of the knowledge of Socrates or Shakespeare. Because 
if the lens is not going to replace our gaze, we need to shape our gaze to give meaning 
to the world . 
Nobel laureate Mario Vargas Llosa (20 l 0) is pessimistic: "The screen willfrivolize and 
banalize culture extraordinarily[ . .] Stupidity has also been massively supported by 
cutting-edge technology. If anything can defend us from this phenomenon of 
frivolization, it is reading Tolstoy, Victor Hugo, Joyce, Don Quixote ". 
As Jose Manuel Navia says, to give meaning to the world, "in our hands is not to 
contribute to that click, click, click ... ea5y, crazy and universal that is j7lling the world 
with photos to use and throw away (and many times not even to use). It is in our hands 
to resist that banalization, the Tolstoy, Joyce and photographic Cervantes turning to 
consolation " (20 I 0, p. 33 7). 
c) The technical and ethical dimension 
Every human action must always be considered from a double perspective as we know 
from the Aristotelian distinction in Nicomachean Ethics. On the one hand, we can 
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measure the technical quality of the work itself 'poiesi·•' (Plato, The banquet, Vol III). 
On the other hand, the ethical dimension of that work 'fr6nesis ' (Aristotle, NE 1142 a), 
which asks me if the technical action I perform makes me a better or a worse person 
following the laws of my human nature. 
[n addition to technical rationality, Aquino considers in the Summa Theologiae that 
every human being possesses this practical ethical rationality, imprinted in our heart. 
We know that "this rationality of the one who must make a decision is called practical 
wisdom or prudence" (Summa Theologiae II-II, 94, I, 3). 
The virtue of prudence considers the laws and general principles always in function of 
a particular action to which the person submits to his conscience. For Aristotle, in 
Nicomachean Ethics, human actions implied living the moral virtues and especially 
prudence, for "it is not possible to be good in the true sense without prudence, nor to 
be prudent without moral virtue " (Etica a Nic6maco, 6, 13). 
Perhaps this seems abstract. Let us see an example. Hitler was a great military strategist 
and Stalin a great expansionist of his ideas. And yet both were a great disaster for the 
history of humanity, which certifies that one can have a good 'teckne' but a lousy 
'ethos'. Therefore, the two types of rationality are always necessary in professional 
action: instrumental technical rationality and practical ethical rationality. Moreover, 
there cannot simply be technical actions (on the one hand) or actions or simply ethical 
actions (on the other). Nor, from a photographic point of view, should we ask ourselves: 
Should photography be ethical? To ask this question would already be an unethical 
question. 
[n short, the photographer must also seek technical and practical perfection. His images 
must show technical quality and the moral good photographed should reflect the dignity 
of the human condition. This photograph that I take is it technically well done and does 
what I have photographed and the intention sought help me to perfect myself as a 
photographer and a person? 
Before going any further, perhaps some may consider that we are being utopian or that 
we are talking about 'moralistic concepts' and not about relevant dimensions that affect 
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any professional field , including photography. As the sociologis.~ on post-industrial 
society Alain Touraine points out "Evil and good exist. Good is what allows man to 
live in a human way. That means to be respected, not to be humiliated, to be recognized 
as equal in rights regardless of whether one is a Peruvian peasant or a Nobel Prize in 
Physics [ .. .} It is a good act that defends my capacity to act in a reflexive way. Not 
because of my social status, but as an individual bearer of a universal subject " 
(Touraine, 20 l 0). 
The [sraeli writer Amos Oz also teaches that the categories of good and evil exist. "Evil 
has an unmistakable smell. Just as it is enormously difficult to define the truth, but very 
easy to detect a lie, sometimes it can be difficult to define good, but evil gives off an 
unmistakable smell; any child knows what pain is. Therefore, eve1y time we 
deliberately cause another person pain, we know what we are doing. We are doing evil. 
Goethe's Faust indelibly reminds us that the devil is not impersonal, butpersonaf. That 
the devil puts each individual to the test{ .. ] [But] individual good and evil are not 
privative of any religion. They don't have to be religious terms. The decision to cause 
harm or not to cause harm is a choice we encounter several times a day. Naturally, 
sometimes we can be wrong. Now, even when we make the wrong decision, we know 
what we are doing. We know the difference between good and evil, between causing 
pain and curing it, between Goethe and Goebbels. Between Weimar and 
Buchenwald. Between individual responsibility and collective bad taste" (2005, p. 16). 
As in all arts, the representation of good and evil is an active issue among 
photographers. And sometimes, because the only raw material of photography IS 
reality, it has been said that evil is very photogenic also because good is invisible. 
But having said this, let us not deceive ourselves in a double sense: first, because the 
consequences of evil or of the representation of evil per se are never innocuous or 
attractive. And second: because if the photographic expression is accused of not 
exhibiting force in the beauty of good, it is not simply because evil is more attractive, 
but because, sometimes, it is difficult or one does not know how to reflect good with 
exigency, force and identity. 
Thus, as Simone Veil points out: "Imaginary evil is [conceived as] romantic, varied; 
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1eal evil, [however} sad monotonous, desert, tedious. [On the other har:d] The 
imaginary good is [portrayed} boring; [however} the real good is always new, 
wonderful intoxicating. [ . .}It does not escape this alternative unless, by force of art, 
it passes from the side of reality, something that only genius can do " ( 1994, p. Ill). 
This is the relevant point: how to offer a good or a photograph that expresses the good 
in an attractive way without seeming naive? How to show the force of good in 
modernity? 
In short, as we shall see in some of Cartier-Bresson's works, capturing photographic 
aesthetic reality in an attractive way requires a threefold characteristic . l) execute the 
work technically well; 2) execute the work ethically well and 3) grasp the 'punctum ' to 
represent its appearance with strength, beauty and intensity. 
2.3.2) On the nature of photography at Cartier-Bresson according to several 
authors 
Having already analyzed the nature of photography in general, we will now see a 
synthesis on the characteristics of Cartier-Bresson photography in particular in eleven 
authors very briefly: 
Fotografiar al natural. El ins/ante decisivo is a small autobiographical book, where the 
photographer Cartier-Bresson exposes some reflections on his life and work in the 
search for the decisive moment. "The writer has the time to reflect before the word is 
formed, before putting it on paper; [ . .}For us, what disappears, disappears forever; 
hence our anguish; we cannot remake our report once we are back in the hotel " 
(Cartier-Bresson, 1952, p. 20) . 
This search for the precise moment to capture the 'decisive moment of action' also 
implies that Cartier-Bresson sought an intentionality in his work: "to understand that 
photography can .fix eternity in a moment". In addition to precision, a certain pleasure 
is necessary for Cartier-Bresson. "I am obsessed with only one thing: visual pleasure. 
My greatest satisfacNon is geometry, i.e. structures, which implies a structure " 
(Cartier-Bresson, 1973). 
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In La vision fotogrit}ica, Eduardo Momefie, photographer and essayist, stresses the 
importance of training to develop one's own visual anthropology in order to discover 
the photographic vocation and understand whether we essentially want to be a new 
Cartier-Bresson (a street photojournalist). Moreover, as the camera is a means, not an 
end, Momefie argues that we must discover our weltanschauung, since the 
intentionality and sense of the world only has the man behind the camera, since the 
camera does not have a sense of the world (Momefie, 1990, p. 120). 
La camm·a de Pandora. La fotograjia despues de Ia fotograjia deals with the change 
of technological paradigm and the refounding of photography after its invention in 
1839. For the international photographer and Professor of Audio-visual 
Communication Joan Fontcuberta there is a rethinking of the values that made 
photography construct the modern gaze, especially also due to the influence of Cartier-
Bresson. According to Fontcuberta, an image is today a banal act in modern society, 
while for Cartier-Bresson it was a moment to fix the history of a moment. Fontcuberta 
believes, among other aspects, that today photographs are no longer documents as 
Cartier-Bresson argued, but diversions (Fontcuberta, 20 I 0, p. 28). 
ln this same sense, in Vida liquida, the Polish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman warns that 
we are moving in a liquid society where there is no longer a capacity for eternal duration 
of bonds and things, but there is a current consumerism of using and throwing away. 
Perhaps that humanistic photography by Cartier-Bresson that seeks to document the 
human soul is unthinkable. The image is today a simple divertimento or a personal 
exhibition from emancipation and individuality to be socially accepted (Bauman, 2005, 
p. 1 09). 
Sobre fotograjia . In this work, Susan Sontag proposes a series of reflections around 
several photographers, among them, Cartier-Bresson. Sontang looks at contexts (wars, 
streets, factories, etc.), intentions (capturing everyday life, stopping time, representing 
identity, etc.) and photographic results (homesick, compilations, etc.) trying to 
reconstruct reflections so that readers can draw their own conclusions about what 
photography consists of. A relevant point is that- according to her- the photographic 
nature today revolves around that divertimento and not on a documentation 'sjact. 
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Paradoxically, this divertimento makes us prefer the representation of the event through 
images, rather than the realization of the event itself. That is to say, the appearance of 
the event before the existence of the event (Son tang, 1996, p. 216). 
Imizgenes, palabras, signos. Sobre arte y filosofia. The Spanish philosopher Fernando 
[nciatte points out that the path taken by contemporary art has consisted of 
simplification since Cezanne. This simplification of modern att consists of getting rid 
of everything that is not essential. As Sontang also says, Inciarte points to the 
"elimination of reality" (2004, p. 21 ), where the world is no longer of interest, but only 
the representation of the world through screens and images. For this author, reality 
continues to be progressively replaced by the representation of the image. Thanks to 
Cartier-Bresson's great impact, we can also say that we know not only the reality of 
the world but also the reality of the world represented with Cartier-Bresson's eyes. 
Deepening in this idea Sobre Ia eterna y feliz confusion alrededor de Ia fotografia , 
philosopher and photographer Jose Manuel Navia (20 1 0) warns about photographic 
nature and confusing misunderstandings. Navia points out that, although it has been 
interpreted that the photographic mission began trying to scientifically reflect reality, 
photography does not capture the same reality, but the appearance of reality. 
In other words, photography belongs to the world, but it is not in itself the world. The 
images are not the same reality, but an interpretation, a representation of reality made 
by a photographer (Navia, 20 I 0, p. 340). So when we look at Cartier-Bresson ' s 
iconographic photos, we do not see reality, but reality interpreted with Cartier-
Bresson's eyes. 
Also in Como leer unafotografia, [an Jeffrey- photography editor, critic and professor 
at Goldsmith College, University of London- warns of this confusion. Jeffery argues 
that it is not the story itself. [t is the history of humanity seen or perceived through the 
eyes of photographers (Jeffrey, p. 7). In addition, Jeffrey also notes that Cartier-Bresson 
was aware that the photojournalism practiced in the 1930s was decadent, coupled with 
the fact that att grew in a philosophical environment, so Cartier-Bresson decided to 
make other less banal images that constituted a kind of meta-narrative or poetic art 
(Jeffrey, 2009, p. 154). 
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Mirar. For the art critic and the Austrian photographer John Berger (200 1 ), the eye of 
the camera and the eye of the artist speak to us of th;;: hidden meaning of the everyday 
gaze in order to discover the decisive moment of Cartier-Bresson or to go beyond the 
apparent action of reality. Thus, according to Berger, we contemplate landscapes, 
animals or people, and sometimes we are unaware of reconsidering the concepts of 
hidden truth, perceived truth, and portrayed truth. 
La camara hlcida (Barthes, 1990) is one of the most influential books of photographic 
philosophy throughout the 20th century. Following the death of his mother, Roland 
Barthes develops his idea of photography as an imprint of reality. For him photography 
and death are two indissoluble themes. 
Barthes considers that the essence of photography- what differentiates it from cinema 
and others media- is what he calls 'noema ': what is photographed is eternalized in the 
photograph taken. Photography eternalizes reality (as Cartier-Bresson intended by 
fixing the decisive moment). 
At the same time, Barthes ( 1990) also distinguishes two elements in each photograph: 
a) the 'studium ' (which has to do with the photographer's culture and taste); b) and the 
'punctum ' or sparkle that would be that which makes something of reality stand out 
like a flash to be captured as a photograph. 
From this perspective, Barthes considers that there is a type of photography that, 
although it possesses the 'studium ', is completely devoid of a 'punctum ', a sparkle that 
attracts or hurts the viewer, because there is a propensity to capture everything, without 
considering what is unique or relevant in reality. This is what he calls trivial 
photography (Barthes, 1990, p. 64-66). Cattier-Bresson offers that 'punctum ' in the 
theory of the decisive moment that he photographed in documenting the five continents. 
2.3.3) Summary 
According to the literature review the main ideas of Cattier-Bresson are as follows in 
this chapter: Cattier-Bresson's photography is born with an intention: to capture the 
decisive moment. This intentionality and sense of the world can only be captured by 
the photographer behind the camera, not by the camera itself. 
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On the other hand, Cartier-Bresson wishes to ~epresent photographic reality as the 
search for 'a visual pleasure ', which is related to beauty. The beauty of Cartier-
Bresson's images is precisely the 'punctum' and the 'studium ', which differentiate 
Cattier-Bresson's images from any other mediocre photo captured by any of us 
according to Roland Batthes. 
Other authors - such as Bauman and Fontcuberta - point out that photography today 
is pure amusement in 'liquid society', where paradoxically one lives more for the photo 
itself than to enjoy an event. Therefore, according to authors such as Inciatte and 
Son tang, it is not the world that interests us, but the representation of the world. The 
truth represented about the real truth, partly in line with Cartier-Bresson, but without 
its aesthetic depth . 
Nevertheless, the application of his philosophy of photography has not been linked to 
any human virtue directly, which is why I have done this research. Now, let us see the 
method used in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In this dissertation we use a realistic philosophy in the interpretation of reality, with a 
comparative literature and a heuristic methodology in the social sciences. 
3.1) The heuristic method 
Heuristics, in Greek to find and invent, is a scientific method that consists according to 
Horst Mi.iler (20 12) in finding a solution for something that does not have an 
algorithmic result, that is to say, that is not mathematical, as for example a hypothesis 
about some study in the social sciences. 
In this dissertation, we have the hypothesis based on the observation that there are 
negative photographic stereotypes about African reality by agencies and Western 
Media. Stereotypes that are perpetuated in time, so we wonder if it will be possible to 
visually portray Kenya (or African reality) with other types of images with a broader 
view and also hope about reality. 
So thinking of a possible solution for this hypothesis, supposes, as heuristics points out, 
to think creatively to see if it is possible to find a solution when facing this hypothesis. 
3.2) Rules, principles and strategies of the heuristic method 
According to Mi.iler (20 L 2) the heuristic method uses rules, principles and strategies to 
find the solution to the problem posed. Let's go by parts: 
L) For Mi.iler the heuristic rules help to find, above all, the means to solve the problem. 
In this sense, one of the most used heuristic rules is to separate \vhat is given ' from 
'what is sought '. In this case, as we have said before, we have worked analyzing the 
number of images of the photographic agencies. We see that a negative image of Kenya 
and of African reality is mostly diffused in the images ( 'what has been given'). The 
idea of this dissertation is to see if another type of photograph can be found and if it 
can be a photograph of hope ( 'what is sought '). 
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Another heuristic rule is also to reformulate the problem which, following our 
dissertation, has materialized in: is it possible to find another photograph and one of 
hope that more reliably shows African reality and everyday life without stereotypes of 
misery or exoticism? 
2) According to Mi.iler, the heuristic principles are suggestions to find the idea to a 
solution, determining a possible way. Within these principles the analogy stands out. 
At this point, for example, the analogy in this dissertation has served us, among others, 
for two relevant ideas. 
On the one hand we have applied the analogy of similarity (partly equal and partly 
different) to the philosophy of hope proposed by Gabriel Marcel in relation to the 
characteristics of photography in Cartier-Bresson (chapter five). 
On the other hand, we have also used analogy when we speak of the different types of 
gaze (chapter six one), since the ways of looking at reality are related analogously to 
the distinction established by the French theologian Jacques Philippe (Inner Freedom, 
2003, p. 31) when he describes the three types of inner freedom that a person can 
configure with his life: freedom of rebellion, freedom of resignation, or freedom of 
acceptance. In our thesis (chapter six one), we establish that it is possible sometimes to 
find a look of resignation in the long professional walk, but also - analogously to the 
teachings of Phillipe - it is possible a look of acceptance and a look of redemption in 
each photographer. 
3) Finally, there are heuristic strategies according to Miller. That is how to organize the 
process of solving the problem addressed. In his opinion there are strategies: 'work 
backwards ': first we examine what we are looking for in order to arrive at what has 
been given; and 'work forwards': from what has been given we make reflections that 
should lead us to the solution of the problem: the hypothesis. 
In this dissertation we have essentially used the strategy 'work forwards': we start from 
the given (stereotypes) to make reflections on photography and the hope in Gabriel 
Marcel that help us find a solution to the problem of the hypothesis of the statement. 
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This h -~uristic strategy has required us to study forward ' by reviewing the history •)f 
philosophy and photography in general (chapter two); and the life and work of Gabriel 
Marcel and Cartier-Bresson, respectively (chapter four). 
To study Gabriel Marcel, we have essentially used the study of Julia Urabayen (2001 ). 
The anthropological thought of Gabriel Marcel, at the same time as we have read 
directly his works El misterio del ser (1964), Homo Viator (2005) and En camino hacia 
que despertar (20 12). Cartier-Bresson, as a photographer, has only one work written, 
although with great repercussions On the decisive moment ( 1952) in Fotografiar del 
natural (20 16). Ideas that he repeats similarly in the two interviews of Sheila Turner 
carried out in 1971 and re-edited by The New York Times (20 13). At the same time, 
these Sheila Turner interviews were edited in video format under the same name in 
1973 by the International Center of Photography (ICP). 
Studying and systematizing the characteristics of both authors in their philosophy and 
photography has allowed us to deduce and construct a symbiosis in the discussion 
(chapter five) establishing 'a look of hope' from a theoretical-practical perspective 
according to Marcel ' s existentialism and Cartier-Bresson ' s photographic eye. 
Finally, we provide some recommendations (chapter six) to get this 'look of hope' 
considering the vital situation of photojournalists, agenctes and the Kenyan 
photographic reality. 
We close this dissertation (chapter seven) using the metaphor of the fleet of ships of 
the British writer CS Lewis, who with other words (but in full syntony with Marcel and 
Cartier-Bresson) considers that personal ethics will always be linked to social ethics in 
coexistence in order to love or portray others. Once again, the reflection on the human 
condition confirms that man remains a social being by nature. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
After analyzing hope and photography in general, in this chapter we will look 
specifically at: life, philosophy and characteristics in Gabriel Marcel ; and life, 
photography and characteristics in Cartier-Bresson. That is to say, in these two chapters 
we answer the first and second research questions of this dissertation. 
4.1) Gabriel Marcel and the ethical characteristics of hope 
4.1.1) Biography 
The case of Gabriel Marcel ( 1889-1973) is patiicular as a thinker, because his 
philosophy was for life and life was for his philosophy. For Marcel, philosophy is a 
reflection that starts from life and returns to life. 
We cannot understand his philosophy without his life and the fact that Gabriel lost his 
mother at the age ofthree and was the only child of a family. His father, a wealthy man, 
remarried his wife's sister to give a home to little Marcel, who will enjoy an excellent 
education (although he will also be influenced by the rigid and unemotional character 
of his new mother). These circumstances and other factors - such as a special 
sensitivity with good musical skills - made Marcel "a brilliant but unhappy student. 
He hated the school system, based on competition for the most outstanding position, 
and was exhausted by the excessive demands of his father, who repeated to him that 
'he could not be the second"' (Urabayen, 2001, p. 3). 
In his youth he was interested in studying Philosophy in the Soborna, but the teachings 
he received there with neo-kantianism did not seem to him to be satisfactory -
according to his biographers- and he went to the College of France, to receive training 
from Bergson and encouraged by philosophical idealism. In 1910, at the age of 21 , he 
obtained the Aggregation exam that facilitated his teaching. 
However, "he hardly devoted himself to teaching. He did not agree with the school 
system and considered that the education o.f philosophy should be based on a personal 
relationship and not on an academic one" (ibid, p. 4) . 
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Later, Marcel worked on the front lines of the first war with the Red Cross, as a non-
combatant soldier and information liaison. He was in charge of bringing news to 
families about soldiers who died, were captured or disappeared in action. This made 
him 'an existential thinker' - as he relates in his letters- and highlighted the falsity of 
the idealistic philosophy, because behind it, there are hidden abstract concepts that 
forget the concrete beings who suffer and die. 
At the end of the war he married Jacqueline Boegner in 1919, a Protestant of religion, 
who brought him a rich family life that he had lacked. Ten years later, Marcel converted 
to Catholicism thanks to the influence of other Catholic friends and intellectuals. 
Paradoxically, says one of his scholars, although "Marcel had grown in an agnostic 
household where his father did not allow religious conversations to take place, Marcel 
was an atheist until he converted to Catholicism in 1929. And Brendan Sweetman 
states: 'It is interesting to note, but not surprising, that his conversion did not 
significantly change his philosophy, although he inevitably came to explore the nature 
of the transcendent more fully in his works"' (Sweetman, 2011 cited in Loudiy, 20 18, 
p. 304). 
Thus Marcel dedicated himself to transcendental depth by composing dramatic works, 
which truly became a reality with the arrival of a new World War II. Once the war was 
over, his wife also converted to Catholicism before dying in 194 7. From then on, 
Marcel would travel and give lectures until his death in Paris ( 1973). 
After these brief biographical notes, it is not surprising that one intuits the personality 
of someone who always went beyond what was foreseen and whose essential question 
in life was: "Who am I? Why not say that the answer to th('. question, 'who am 1', is my 
life in its totality?" (Marcel, 1964, p. 132). 
In other words, if my being is my life, it means understanding that - for Marcel -
philosophy is a system of a deepening of the human condition, not a construction for 
intellectual life: "the self (person) is the body, with its wounds and sorrows, 
experiences and mystery" (Marcel, 1970, p. 22). In summary, Marcel's anthropology 
is based on an existential knowledge of the beings in each being. 
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Thus, Marcel asks himself the question 'What is essential and what is accidental in 
life?' responding also to the Heideggerian formulation: "Why am I something and not 
nothing?" and "Am I something between two nothingness?" (Heidegger, 1942, p. 22), 
Marcel "considers that the question about being includes the question about the being 
who asks the question, " since access to being is made through beings, through the life 
of beings (Urabayen, 200 I, p. 27). 
On the other hand, Marcel has gone down in the history of philosophy by making a 
valuable contribution between problem and mystery. "This refers to the distinction 
which is central to me and which appears in the whole of my writings: the distinction 
between the mysterious and the problematic. The problem is something we encounter, 
something that cuts us off It is in its entirety before me. On the contrary, mystery is 
something where !find myself, whose essence is therefore not to be before me " (Marcel, 
Diary. Etre et Avoir, 22 October 1932, p. 144). In this sense, for Marcel, man is not a 
problem, man is a mystery. Whereas a problem is in front of me and it is something 
external that can be reduced in order to dominate it. However, the mystery is within 
me, and I cannot leave my being to understand it and reduce it (Urabayen, 200 l , p. 27). 
For Marcel, man is a human mystery and not a problem to be solved. At the same time 
it is a mystery because "I cannot say everythir.g about a being (a person). I can never 
say the whole being, the heart 'ofwhat is' can never be said". This also means that 
man's being "cannot be expressed by human language, because human language 
objectifies and uses abstract concepts that are inadequate to express the concreteness 
and individuality of the human being" (Urabayen, 200 l , p. 27). 
4.1.2) Hope in Gabriel Marcel 
a) Definition of hope 
For the French philosopher, all human beings have experienced hope but, according to 
Marcel, its nature is very difficult to define. As we saw about being, hope is also a 
mystery and not a problem. "Hope is a mystery because, according to Marcel, it 
transcends eve1y particular object. It is not a 'I hope that' but a 'I hope'". For this 
reason, Marcel proposed to carry out an existential analysis of it, without defining it, 
because he considered that "the only way to understand what hope is was to have 
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recourse to the experience of the affirmation ' I hope'[ . .] This is lived as a response 
to a trial, to a situation of captivity that is characterized by the impossibility 'of 
accessing a certain lived fullness '" (Urabayen, 200 l, p. 158). That is to say, the 
existential analysis highlights that the basis of hope is found in a situation that invites 
'to despair ' and that, precisely, hope consists in overcoming despair. 
b) Hope and being 
Both go hand in hand for Marcel. A man who walks is a man who hopes to reach a 
goal; and conversely, a man who waits is a man who walks, who goes towards 
something or someone. [We have explained this by narrating the evolution of the 
concept of hope in the history of the philosophy and its relationship with time and the 
sense of time (cf. Ref. 2.2.1 On the nature of hope)]. 
"Hope is what makes walking not a simple mistake" Ricoeur suggested to him in 1968 
during a meeting with Marcel. This means (as Ricoeur commented) that "·we must place 
being and hope on the same ontological side. We will also understand this link if we 
understand the profound unity of hope and itinerancy " (Urabayen, 2001, p. 154). Hope, 
together with itinerancy, is the driving force behind the journey of the travelling man. 
Parallelly, about that pilgrim in the land Marcel speaks of, Pieper establishes a relevant 
distinction in Las virtudes fundamentales (Pieper, 20 l 0, p. 359). This work is an 
implicit dialogue with Heidegger, whom he has in mind. For Pieper the man until his 
death is in "'status viatoris ', the state of the being that is on the way, opposite to the 
'status comprehensoris ' of the one who has grasped, achieved, reached [already the 
way}. To be on the road, to be viator, means to walk towards happiness; while, to be 
comprehensor, means to possess happiness " (ibid) . 
His conclusion is clear: the meaning of the 'status viatoris' is for the 'status 
comprehensoris ': "Human existence is temporary only as 'status viatoris ', which is the 
'not yet ' of the creature who knows that it includes the possibility of the 'turn to 
nothingness ', of a choice of f reedom but which should be overcome by the definitive 
fixation of being and the aspiration to the fitllness of being. Furthermore, to be a 
creature means 'to be held 'vvithin nothingness ' (Heidegger); but, moreover, to be a 
creature means to be grounded in the absolute being and to be easily oriented toward 
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the being: toward one's own being and toward the divine being at the same time" 
(Pieper, 2010, p. 364). 
c) On hope and time 
Marcel expresses this idea of Pieper in a similar way by making another comparison. 
"Hope is related to itinerancy and "presupposes an 'open time ' as opposed to the 
'closed time' of the contracted soul" (Urabayen, 2001, p. 159). If man places himself 
in the point of view of the experience already constituted, time cannot bring him 
anything new. This is how despair arises, which is the consciousness of closed time or 
of time as a prison. However, "hope presents itself as making its way through time, 
where the closed man is the tense and impatient man, while the open man is the man 
able to take his time " (ibid) . 
In short, to wait is, according to Marcel, to live in hope and to overcome the despair of 
fear, fear and anguish. Hope is a liberation, but it is a gift reserved for a few. "Deep 
down, hope coincides with life itself as long as life is taken as something sacred, as a 
divine giji" (ibid, p. 159). 
Hence, for Marcel, hope depends and does not depend on man; "it presents itself as 
offered and yet if is in man 's power to accept it: 'the gift is a call to which we must 
respond '" (ibid, p. 159). That is why Marcel asked himself: "Is it not possible for hope 
to be another name for the need for transcendence, or for it to be this same need, 
inasmuch as it is the secret springboard of the itinerant man? Hope is a lffe and a life 
overflowing, in no sense a life withdrawn into itself" (ibid). 
4.1.3) Characteristics of hope in Gabriel Marcel 
After a quick introduction, let us now delve deeper into the four essential characteristics 
offered by the hope of Gabriel Marcel. 
According to Julia Urabayen in El pensamiento antropol6gico de Gabriel i\!Jarcel, 
Marcel ' s anthropology is neither a systematic nor a closed philosophical system. Not 
even his plays and writings present a classification or a list of conditions on existence. 
As we have indicated, Marcel reflects from his own existential experience of the self 
in Europe at the beginning and middle of the twentieth century. And he studies the 
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:!xistence of men from a double method: access to beings (from ontology and the 
investigation of metaphysical conditions) and the perspective of beings (from 
phenomenological analysis). 
The metaphysical conditions of man for Marcel according to Urabayen (200 l , p. 32) 
are four : incarnation, itinerancy, intimacy and intersubjectivity. As we saw, for 
Aquinas (Summa Theologiae, II-II , q. 40, a. l, a) there are also four : arduous and 
possible future well. 
Thus, we could make a correlation between the conditions of the true hope of both: that 
it be a good (the incarnation in Marcel); that it be a future (the itinerancy in Marcel); 
that it be an arduous thing (the discovery of intimacy according to Marcel) and that it 
be possible to achieve (life in God and in others according to Marcel). 
Let us look at Marcel's notes on hope in according to Urabayen (2001): 
a) The incarnation of man 
For Marcel , the security of existence is based on the incarnation of man. Philosophy 
requires an existential experience at its starting point and the experience cannot be that 
of the Cartesian 'thinking cogito ', or the 'idea ' of being in Hegel, but the incarnation 
is an existential experience which for Marcel is a security and not simply a thinking 
certainty. In other words, access to the question of being is made from incarnate beings. 
For Marcel "there are no men without bodies and ties to the world in which he lives. 
(Urabayen, 200 l , p. 32). As we said, "The self (person) is the body, with its wounds 
and sorrows, experiences and mystety " (Marcel, 1970, p. 22). Man is an incarnate 
being who is accountable for his own talents. But it is necessary to awaken to life, to 
leave the state of inertia or routine in which men inhabit if one wishes to live. 
On the one hand, the example of the book taken to the film Awakenings, based on a 
real fact of the neurologist Oliver Sacks, when a sick person wakes up in the Hospital 
after spending more than I 0 years in a vegetative state, serves as an example. In the 
face of the miracle, the conscious and awake patient calls his doctor on the telephone: 
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"We have tc_ remind everyone. How wonderf~tl it is .. . ", says the sick man. 
"And what's wonderful? " He asks, the doctor. 
"Read the newspaper. There is only bad news" (costs the cured patient). "People have 
forgotten what .. . life is ... People have forgotten the 'miracle of being alive '. They need 
someone to tell them. They need someone to remind them what they have and what they 
can lose. They need to be told about living. The gift of life. Of the freedom to live, " 
concludes the sick person awake after 10 years in a vegetative state " (Abbott, 1990, 
Awakenings). 
b) Roaming. Man is a being in time 
For Marcel, time is not denial , but openness, "time does not reside in the experience of 
finitude , but in the experience of participating in being for eternity, " says Urabayen. 
"For Marcel, as for the risen sick person in Awakenings, life is a giji and the 
conception of time is the affirmation of the distinction between the being of man and 
the different ways of living in time: as an open time- or time of being- and as a closed 
time - or time of having-. The central deficiency of the 'existential philosophies of 
anguish ' consists, in my opinion, in ignoring in a completely arbitrmy way a 
fundamental experience that I would gladly calf the gaudium essendi" (Urabayen, 
200 I , p. 32). 
As we know, the existentialists of the mid-twentieth century such as Sartre, Camus or 
Heidegger taught that man was a being thrown into death and nothingness, as the writer 
Ernest Hemingway wrote in 1933 with his famous Our Father: "Our nada who art in 
nada, nada be thy name thy kingdom nada thy will be nada in nada as it is in nada. 
Give us this nada our daily nada and nada us our nada as we nada our nadas and nada 
us not into nada but deliver us from n.'1da; pues nada. Hail nothing full of nothing, 
nothing is with thee" (Hemingway, 1933, p. 18). 
"To say it clearly: in a line of Freudian thought, [for these, existentialists] to die is 
truly to be undone, while for me it is to be fit!filled, " says Marcel (Marcel, 2012, p. 59). 
Nor can the answer be despair according to Pieper (Urabayen, 2001 , p. 365), for "the 
meaning of created existence is not nothing, but being, that is, truth. The only amwer 
that corresponds to the real situation of human existence is hope, because in it man is 
understood and cif.firmedfirsl and foremost as a created being, as a creature of God". 
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Even so, Marcel insists, hope needs to be tested in despuir. The two go hand in hand, 
as if they were two sides of the same coin. In the complexity of modern life, it is 
difficult to avoid the despair and anguish of man in 'status viatoris' but, as the 
theologian Urs Von Balthasar points out: "Man must enjoy in hisjiniteness the infinite 
light of God. The edges of his existence, the before and the after, are not illuminated. 
You must not count on them, for as Ecclesiasticus (41, 3-4) says: 'Do not be afraid of 
death; it is your destiny. In the world of the dead the duration of life does not count ' " 
(Von Balthasar, 1960, p. 36). In other words, there is only light for this life. No longer 
for the past, nor for the future only light for the present. 
In short, Marcel considers life as an open time, as a gift, a Gaudium essendi, in 'status 
viatoris ', as opposed to closed time, in 'status comprehensoris ' in Pieper's words. 
c) Personal inner and openness to overcome time 
Marcel adds that man must recognize his own personal intimacy in his incarnated 
existential self. The first knowledge is this incarnate self where one discovers that the 
person is 'imago Dei'. Thus, if man has a sacred character, man is a personal being 
who must establish a relationship between his own freedom and transcendence with the 
creator. Thus, man's mission is to discover 'Gaudium essendi', which will spare him 
the anguish of time. 
In short, this means beginning a process of sensitive and permanent awareness in the 
world . First, an intimacy with oneself in the consciousness. Then with the world and 
with God. Thus, as he points out in Homo Viator, hope is "essentially the availability 
of a soul deeply committed to an experience ofcommunion" (Marcel, 2005, p. 20). That 
is, a communion with God in my existential self. 
Today we have perceived difficulties and conditions in recogmzmg our personal 
identity. For example, in totalitarian states . The words of the former Czech president 
V aclav Havel ( 1990, p. 40), who asked himself where is the true root of the power of 
man against communism? Where is finally the power of those who had no power? 
According to the former Czech president, opposition to a totalitarian system such as 
commumsm IS 'life in truth' against regime's lies: "Sometimes you need to get to the 
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bottom of misery in order to unders~1nd the truth. And the only point from which it can 
start is from the concrete man". This is why the real opposition lies on "a totally 
different level, the level of human consciousness, the 'existential level ' ". And Havel 
continues by pointing out that "this existential level is a power that is not based on the 
strength of a group, but operates in the gloom of the space of each man " ( 1990, p. 40). 
Another temptation in modern life is a liquid life without time. In the society of 'haste' 
one can fall into a routine, robotic life. If the compass is replaced by the clock, one can 
fall into dehumanization without direction, without north. 
Where are we going, why do we run, for whom do I work, to whom do I offer my life? 
The intimacy of the consciousness is related to the fact of being aware ofpresentialism: 
here I am in the world. 
According to the bestseller Spanish writer and philosopher of the of presentialism Pablo 
D' Ors, it is about discovering 'the life behind life' in order to discover the meaning of 
my life in 'my' conscience: "I had had so many experiences throughout my life that I 
had reached a point where, without fear of exaggerating, I can say that I did not know 
well or who I was: I had travelled to many countries; I had read thousands of books; I 
had an agenda with many contacts and I had fallen in love with more women than I 
could remember. Like many of my contemporaries, I was convinced that the more 
experiences I had and the more intense they were, the sooner and better I would become 
a person in fullness" (O'Ors, 2017, p. 13). 
"Today I know that this is not the case: the amount of experiences and their intensity 
only serve to stun us. Living too many experiences is usually harmful. I do not believe 
that man is made for quantity, but for quality. Experiences, if yvu live to collect them, 
shake us up, offer us utopian horizons, get us drunk and corifused. The human soul is 
the food and the rhythm of what is offered to it is slow"[. .. ] (ibid, p. 13). 
"In the tempest of experiences we prefer waves: it gives us the impression of life, when 
the truth is that they are not life, but only vivacity. All our experiences tend to compete 
with life, and almost always succeed in di!>placing or even nullifying it. True life is 
behind what we call life " (ibid, p. 13). 
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"It has taken me four decades to understand f:'wt man begins to live in the life that 
stops dreaming about himself We begin to bear fruit when we stop building castles in 
the air. That there is nothing that does not have its strain the reality. This is, in essence, 
what meditation teaches. Because we normally live dispersed, that is to say, outside of 
ourselves. Meditation concentrates us, brings us back home, teaches us to live with our 
being" (ibid, p. 20). 
d) lntersuhjectivity like existential security of the man 
The level of communion with other beings is what Gabriel Marcel calls 
intersubjectivity. For Marcel the fundamental forms of intersubjectivity are the 
personal encounter with another man, the family, the human community and the 
personal encounter with God. 
As we said in one of the previous points, the French philosopher (2005, p. 20) pointed 
out that hope "is an experience of communion"[. . .] explaining that ''there is no hope 
except at the level of the 'we', of the agape, and not at the level of a solitmy I who 
would become obnubilate with his individual ends". In this sense, Marcel points out 
his adherence to the words of the Spanish poet Antonio Machado when he wrote: "pay 
attention: a solitary heart is not a heart " (2003, pt. LXVI) . 
Fadoua Loudiy considers that "Marcel's philosophical disagreement with Sartre and 
effort to dissociate his work from 'existentialism' concerned the meaning of 
autonomy". According to Loudiy, "For Sartre, autonomy refers to the individual's 
freedom to make decisions based on independence from others. Marcel, however, 
conceived ofautonomy as embedded in our relationships and engagement with others, 
based on openness to others, as we are 'incarnate beings"' (20 18, p. 305). 
I mean, hope is for the other. And such was the desire for hope that Marcel pointed out 
that "I am not concerned about my own death, but about the death of the loved one " 
(20 12, p. 129) but even so he considered that the hope of "loving a person is to tell 
him: you will not die " ( 1964, p. 4 72). Love can with death. 
On the other hand, fleeing from Sartre ' s existentialist individualism, Marcel would also 
agree with the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor in his Malaise of Jvfodernity ( 1994, 
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64) when Taylor points out that "discovering my identity for myself does not mean that 
I elaborate it in isolation, but that I negotiate it through dialogue. My Dwn entity 
depends crucially on my dialogical relationship with others, "for "the most egocentric 
and narcissistic forms of contemporary culture are manifestly inadequate. And forms 
that opt for self-realization without considering the demands of our ties with others 
destroy the conditions for realizing authenticity itself" (ibid, p. 71 ). 
We can apply to Marcel the words pronounced by Andrei Tarkovsky ( 1932-1986), 
precisely to Sculpting in time, when the Russian filmmaker and director of photography 
- as if it were a vital need of each artist - pointed out that "in all my works I have 
endeavored to establish bonds of union that unite people (leaving aside merely material 
interests). Ties of union which, for example, unite me to humanity and link all of us to 
what surrounds us. I must emphatically feel my spiritual continuity and the fact that I 
am not by chance in this world" (Tarkovsky, 1986, p. 217). 
[n summary, we have analyzed in this last chapter-together with reflections and works 
by other authors-the four characteristics of Marcel's philosophy: I) The incarnation of 
man, 2) in time, 3) he must discover his own intimacy, 4) in order to be able to open 
up to others. Let us now move on to Cartier-Bresson's study, specifically life, 
photography and the relevant notes in this photographer, considered the eye of the 
twentieth centwy. 
4.2) Henri Cartier-Bresson and the positive characteristics of his photograph 
4.2.1) Biography 
The Frer,ch photographer Henri Cartier-Bresson (1908-204) did not argue m 
eschatological debates about photography. However, he brought to the history of 
photographic-nature his vision of the decisive moment, "to understand that 
photography canjix eternity in a moment" (Pogrebin, 2007). This implies that Cartier-
Bresson has an intentionality in his photography, which consists of valuing a relevant 
fact among a succession offacts of a reality. 
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Moreover, for the French photographer, photography must take into acccunt the beauty 
of the composition "of a certain visual pleasure" that reflects the human condition 
(Cartier-Bresson, 20 13). 
Ca11ier-Bresson was born into a well-to-do French family at the beginning of the 
century, without economic concerns, interested in art. "When I was ve1y young, !liked 
the life of adventure and I knew only one thing: that I was strongly appalled by the idea 
of working in the family textile business. I was 5 or 6 when he died, and I had always 
been dreaming about painting. And my father said, 'Well, all right. ' He was nice 
enough not to force me into the business" (Cartier-Bresson, 20 13). The young Cartier-
Bresson decided to be a painter seduced by the surrealism and impressionism of the 
time in Paris. After finishing his painting studies in 1927-1928 he discovered the 
strength of photography through its relationship with painting. In 1932, the young 
Henri Cartier-Bresson, saw the Munkacsi photograph Three Boys at Lake Tanganyika, 
taken on a beach in Liberia. 
Figure 4.1. Boys running into the surf at Lake Tanganyika, ca. 1930 © Martin Munkacsi. 
51 
Henri Cartier-Bresson - as we have sr.id before - noted that ''for me this photogra_IJh 
was the spark that ignited my enthusiasm. I saw that photograph and I must say that 
the same photograph was the spark that set fire to the fireworks. Suddenly I understood 
that photography can fix eternity in a moment [. .. ]I couldn't believe it. Such a thing 
could be captured with the camera. Damn it, I took my camera and went out into the 
street " (Pogrebin, 2007). Since then, "the (camera) Leica, became the extension of my 
eye" (Cartier-Bresson, 2016, p. 16). 
4.2.2) Photography at Henri Cartier-Bresson 
After this event -like Paul of Tarsus fallen from his horse- Henri Cartier-Bresson will 
devote himself body and soul to photography. "Photography as I conceive it, well, it's 
a drawing immediate sketch done with intuition and you can 't correct it. Ifyou have to 
correct it, it 's the next picture. But life is very fluid. Well, sometimes the pictures 
disappear and there's nothing you can do. You can 't tell the person, 'Oh, please smile 
again. Do that gesture again. 'Life is once, forever " (Cartier-Bresson, 20 13). 
Impressed by action and the passage of time, Cattier-Bresson writes The decisive 
moment ( 1952), a small autobiographical essay that will decisively influence the history 
of 20th century photography. In this work - also edited as a documentary by the 
International Center for Photography (NYC) - Cartier-Bresson exposes this famous 
photographic theory of capturing 'the decisive moment'. For Cartier-Bresson, 
photographing means shooting at the right time, neither before nor after. It means being 
patient, "like an animal on its prey" (Capa, 1973). 
"What I am desperately looking for is the unique photo, which is enough for itself 
because of its rigor (without pretending to do art, psychology, psychoanalysis or 
sociology). An image that is enough of itself for its intensity, and whose subject exceeds 
the simple anecdote. Therefore, the difference between a good photograph and a bad 
photograph is a matter of millimeters. A small difference, but essential" (ibid, 1973). 
Cartier-Bresson did not consider himself a photojournalist. Although paradoxically is 
considered one of the fathers of photojournalism, "I am not a journalist. That's 
accidental, anecdotic. If I go to a place, I try to get a photo that concretizes a situation 
that has evetything: a strong relationship of forms and background" (ibid, 1973). 
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And Cartier-Bres.>on complains that "some journalists are wonderful writers and 
others are just putting P:tcts one after the other. And facts are not interesting It 's a 
point of view on facts which is important " (Cartier-Bresson, 20 13). "Through facts, 
however, we can reach an understanding of the laws that govern them, and be better 
able to select the essential ones which communicate reality" (Cartier-Bresson, 1952, 
para. 20). 
[ntensity, evocation, stories. "In the photograph there must be evocation. Like some 
stories of Chejov or Maupassant, there have to be little stories in those images. 
Photographs that have an inner world within them" (Capa, 1973). [tis appreciated that 
Cartier-Bresson is interested in how to read an image "and the photographs I care 
about are those that can be looked at for more than two minutes, which is extremely 
long Photographs that you can look at over and over again are not many" (ibid, 1973). 
A certain aesthetic taste is also necessary for photography. "I am obsessed by one thing, 
the visual pleasure. The greatest joy for me is geometry; that means a structure. You 
can't go shootingfor structure, for shapes, for patterns and all this, but it is a sensuous 
pleasure, an intellectual pleasure, at the same time to have evetything in the right 
place. It's a recognition of an order which is in front of you" (Cartier-Bresson, 2013). 
Also, it is necessary to take care of the composition. "Composition must be one of our 
constant preoccupations, but at the moment of shooting it can stem only from our 
intuition, for we are out to capture the fugitive moment, and all the interrelationships 
involved are on the move. In applying the Golden Rule, the only pair of compasses at 
the photographer 's disposal is his own pair of eyes" (Cartier-Bresson, 1952, para. 34). 
For Cartier-Bresson to live is to communicate as a photographer the search for the 
decisive moment. "The writer has time to reflect[ .. .]. But for photographers, what has 
gone is gone forever. From that fact stem the anxieties and strength of our profession. 
We cannot do our slaty over again once we've got back to the hotel" (Cartier-Bresson, 
1952, para. 16). 
"If a photograph is to communicate its subject in all its intensity, the relationship of 
form must be rigorously established. Photography implies the recognition of a rhythm 
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in the world of real things. What the eye does is to find and focus on the particular 
subject within the mass of reality; what the camera does is simply to register uponfilm 
the decision made by the eye. We look at and perceive a photograph, as we do a 
painting, in its entirety and all in one glance. In a photograph, composition is the result 
of a simultaneous coalition, the organic coordination of elements seen by the eye. One 
does not add composition as though it were an afterthought superimposed on the basic 
subject material, since it is impossible to separate content from form. Composition must 
have its own inevitability about it" (Cartier-Bresson, 1952, para. 30). 
As can be seen, what is important is not the camera, but the eye, the intentionality and 
the background behind the 30 centimeters behind the camera: the personality of the 
photographer. (Various aspects that we have already mentioned in the previous 
chapters on the nature of photography, cf. 2.3.1). 
Finally, we can also point out his fascination with reportages and portraits. He captured 
the world in different themes such as social tensions or conflicts in the five continents 
(India, Spain, Benin, Soviet Union), and he has been considered the eye of the twentieth 
century. In these trips, we cannot forget that its thread was always the person and acts 
of men, so Cartier-Bresson is considered one of the fathers of humanistic photography 
where the person is the center of photographic life. "Honestly, the hardest thingfor me 
is the portrait. It 's like a question mark you put on someone t1ying to say: what is the 
meaning of this face?" (Capa, 1973). 
4.2.3) The characteristics of photography at Henri Cartier-Bresson 
In short, the characteristics of photography according to Cartier-Bresson are : 
a) To live is to communicate a photographic intentionality 
Cartier-Bresson defines photography as "putting the eye, head and heart in the 
same spotlight: the viewfinder" (Cartier-Bresson, 2016, p. II). This definition 
presupposes already understanding photography as something intentional (as 
Aristotle already defended over all human actions). That is, composing a 
photograph involves using intellectual and volitional abilities to do so with a certain 
intention, beyond the simple technical question of shooting the button (because no 
good photographer shoots for the sake of shooting). In short: Cartier-Bresson' s 
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photographic definition reveals that the French photographer has a holistic view of 
the human being. "To me, photography is the simultaneous recognition, in a 
fraction of a second, of the significance of an event as well as of a precise 
organization of forms which give that event its proper expression" (Cartier-
Bresson, 1952, para. 58). 
Figure 4.2. Scanno, Abruzzo, Italy 1953 © Henri Cartier-Bresson 
b) The decisive moment 
As we have seen, Cartier-Bresson influenced the history of photographic att with the 
publication of The Decisive Moment (1952), in order to fix the eternity of an action in 
its due moment, neither before nor after. This can be seen in the following image 
(Behind the Gare St Lazare, Paris, France 1932) when - for a brief thousandths of a 
second - the mirror effect of the shadow of the man jumping over the puddle ts 
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produced, just before the person falling breaks the duplication of his body in the water. 
For this reason, it is the photographer's merit to stop exactly that when in order to try 
to catch that decisive moment, which implies that the photographer is on alert to look 
at the world with new and precise eyes . 
However, Cattier-Bresson points out doubts about how to look at the world in order to 
take a good photograph, since ''I'm not sure that this is radically new". And he notes : 
"There are no new ideas [of seeing} the world. There is only one new order of things 
in the world. Eve1ything is new. Every minute is new and that requires re-examining 
things: life changes all the time. The world is created and falls apart every minute. You 
have to be present when there is a change because there is a moment of tension" (Capa, 
1973). 
Figure 4.3. Behind the Gare St Lazare, Paris, France 1932 © Henri Cartier-Bresson 
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c) Good image composition means recognizing the order of redity 
Cartier-Bresson ' s images confirm the 'punctum' and 'studium 'mentioned above by the 
critic Roland Barthes. There is a decisive moment ('punctum') that makes photography 
different from others as a result of observing reality ('studium '). Cartier-Bresson 
considers that capturing the decisive moment must also be ordered the composition of 
the image in order to achieve "the visual poelly. I'm obsessed by one thing, the visual 
pleasure. The greatest joy for me is geometry. It is to have everything in the right place. 
It's a recognition of an order which is in front of you" (Cartier-Bresson, 20 13). 
And he points out "that's why photography is important, in a way, because at the same 
time that it 's a great pleasure getting the geometry together, it goes quite far in a 
testimony of our world. I enjoy shooting a picture. Being present. It's a way of saying, 
'Yes!'[ ... ] Even ifit 's something you hate. 'Yes! ' It 's an affirmation" (Cartier-Bresson, 
20 13). Waiting for the decisive moment implies discarding because - as we said -
"some journalists are wonderjitl writers and others are just putting facts one after the 
other. But facts are not interesting. It 's a point of view on facts which is important" 
(Cartier-Bresson, 20 13). "Through facts, however, we can reach an understanding of 
the laws that govern them " (Cartier-Bresson, 1952, para. 20). Here, the fact in which 
the girl runs with the geometric composition in the streets. 
Figure 4. 4. Island of Siphnos, Cyclades, Greece 1961 © Henri Cartier-Bresson 
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,d) The centrality of the person in the image 
The school of humanist photography places man at the center of the photographic scene 
and aims to show the daily life he wishes to recover after the world war, as in that image 
of a Sunday on the banks of the Seine de Cartier-Bresson. 
"The camera enables us to keep a sort of visual chronicle. For me, it is my diaty. We 
photo-reporters are people who supply information to a world in a hurry, a world 
weighted down with preoccupations, prone to cacophony, and full of beings with a 
hungerfor information and needing the companionship of images. We photographers, 
in the course of taking pictures, inevitably make a judgment on what we see, and that 
implies a great responsibility" (Cartier-Bresson, 1952, para. 50). 
Figure 4.5. Sunday on the Banks of the Marne, France 1938 ©Henri Cartier-Bresson 
[n short, the four characteristics of Cartier-Bresson mean that photographing consists 
of living by putting "the head, the eye and the heart in the same spotlight: the 
viewfinder " (Cartier-Bresson, 2016, p. 11 ): 
I) Wishing to communicate a photographic intentionality. 
2) The composition of the scene in order to recognize the order of reality. 
3) Waiting for the decisive instant. 
4) Where the person is usually the center of reference. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCUSSION 
After answering the first and second research questions (on hope and photography in 
Gabriel Marcel and in Cartier-Bresson), we will now attempt to analyze the third point 
outlined in this research question in the next chapter. This is the symbiosis between the 
philosopher and the photographer. 
5.1) What is the correspondence between the characteristics of Marcel's 
philosophy and Cartier-Bresson's photographs? 
Gabriel Marcel and Cartier-Bresson are well-known authors in philosophy and 
photography. This study is an attempt to apply Marcelian philosophy to Bressonian 
photography. None of the authors mentioned so far has reflected this perspective of the 
consideration of a philosophy ofhope in Cartier-Bresson ' s photography. This is where 
this dissertation has its originality. 
5.1.1) The incarnation in Marcel & Communication at Cartier-Bresson 
'Who am I?' For Gabriel Marcel, to understand one's own incarnation is to try to 
understand the existential meaning of one's own man. Marcel tries to answer 
Heidegger's question "Why am I something and not nothing? " (Heidegger, 1942, p. 
22). Marcel answers that question as follows: "And why not say that the answer to the 
question, 'who am !', is my life in its totality?" (Marcel, 1964, p. 130). That is , my 
being is my own incarnation. And my existential security is based on the incarnation 
ofman as ' imago Dei' . 
However, Cartier-Bresson did not go so far as to pose directly- at least in his writings 
or public audiovisuals- a sense of existence or of transcendental existence. He simply 
lives existence, shaping the life he observes. "The world is created and falls apart every 
minute. Death is present everywhere since we are born and the tragic meaning of life 
is a very beautiful thing because there are always two poles [life and death} and one 
cannot exist without the other. And it is these tensions that always move me " (Capa, 
1973). 
For Cartier-Bresson there is a dialogue between life and the artist, because "/believe 
that, through the act of living, the discovery of oneself is made concurrently with the 
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discove1y of the world ·1round us, which can mold us, but which can also be affected 
by us. A balance must be established between these two worlds: the one inside us and 
the one outside us. As the result of a constant reciprocal process, both these worlds 
come to form a single one. And it is this world that we must communicate " (Cattier-
Bresson, 1952, para. 57). 
Cartier-Bresson was asked by a photojournalist: ";, Where do you place yourself in 
there? I have no idea-impulsive. I am extremely impulsive. Terribly. It's reaffy a pain 
in the neck for my friends and family. I'm a bunch of nerves. But I take advantage of it 
in photography. I never think. I set, quick! I hit! " (Cartier-Bresson, 20 13). We can say 
that Cartier-Bresson does not know who I am, but what I'm here for. In positive terms, 
the incarnation of Marcel's man in Cartier-Bresson would be the incarnation of man in 
a painter-photographer. 
Conclusion. Gabriel Marcel has a transcendental vision. Henri Cartier-Bresson moves 
without it, living is a fact in itself, for the capture of reality without a reason to explain 
the world. This does not mean that Cartier-Bresson does not have human whys- in his 
own way- about the good of humanity; but his are not supernatural whys. For Henri 
Cartier-Bresson, life is simply a matter of fact, merely pragmatic, aesthetic and 
communicative. 
5.1.2) Man's itinerancy in time in Marcel & Captul"ing the decisive moment in 
Cartier-Bresson 
For Gabriel Marcel ''time does not reside in the experience ojjlnitude. Life is a gift and 
the conception of time is the affirmation of the different ways of living in time: as an 
open time -or time of being- and as a closed time -or time of having- " (U rabayen, 
20 I l, 32). Marcel proposes a time as an opportunity to discover its essence in 'status 
comprenhensoris ', that is, open to what may become in the future , trying to discover 
an oppottunity to know who he is and to gain hope in the face of the threat of existential 
anguish. 
For Cartier-Bresson, his work consists in capturing the various decisive moments 
within time, without wondering whether the decisive images are ethically good or bad. 
We do not know if Cattier-Bresson wondered if, in addition to being a good technical 
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and aesthetic photographer, those i•nages made him a better person. It is true that the 
images reflected by Cartier-Bresson are photographs that, from their composition and 
content, try to see the world because, as we have already pointed out in Cartier-Bresson 
"what I am desperately looking for is the single photo which is enough for itself 
because of its rigor (without pretending to do art, psychology, psychoanalysis or 
sociology). An image whose theme exceeds the simple anecdote " (Capa, 1973). 
But this does not indicate whether Cartier-Bresson was in ' status comprenhensoris ', 
that is, open to an ethic of hope of what may become the future, trying to discover a 
transcendental opportunity before his era after the world wars, with the rise of 
ideologies and the division of the world into blocks. 
On the other hand, we can say that both artists were reflective people, concerned with 
opening up and capturing the world. As good humanists, Gabriel Marcel and Cartier-
Bresson perceive that what is impottant is not speed, but depth in order to grasp the 
depth of the human condition. And although we may think that Cartier-Bresson is 
interested in capturing the decisive moment, this fleeting nature of time is precisely 
about defining the relevant action among a succession of events. Something that can 
define what is portrayed, neither before nor after. 
And this sense of Cartier-Bresson's human depth is also appreciated in the 
consideration of time when it was said that "/ have travelled a good deal, though I 
don't really know how to travel. !like to take my time about it, leaving between one 
country and the next an interval in which to digest what I've seen. Once I had arrived 
in a new country, !feel almost like settling down there, so as to live on proper terms 
with the country. I could never be a globetrotter " (Cattier-Bresson, 1952, para. 8) "I 
hate tourism! I like to live in a place! I don't like to go for a ,)·hort time. Rodin said, 
'What is made with time, time respect ' " (Cattier-Bresson, 20 13). 
Conclusion. We can say that somehow Marcel and Cattier-Bresson come to recover 
the old philosophical debate between Parmenides and Heraclitus in Ancient Greece 
resolved by Aristotle. While Marcel is a supporter of life in being, Cartier-Bresson is a 
follower of Heraclitus's ideas of 'panta rhei ',where nothing remains in reality as we 
see when he points out that "everything is new. Evety minute is new, and this requires 
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a ;-e-examination of things: life changes conti 1ually. The world is created and falls 
apart every minute " (Capa, 1973). 
[f Cattier-Bresson's photography consists in capturing the fleeting instants of time 
always in motion, the same capturing of those decisive moments - as he says- "to fix 
eternity " (Pogrebin, 2007), it is somehow the attempt to capture- as Aristotle would 
say- the essence ofthe accidental that is always present in every change. 
5.1.3) Personal inner in Marcel & Recognition of order in Cartier-Bresson 
Marcel's third existential security is the knowledge of his intimacy and openness as a 
response to overcome time. That is to say, for Gabriel Marcel it is a question of 
recognizing that man is 'imago Dei '. From this perception Marcel understands that man 
has a sacred character, and that there is a personal being who establishes a relationship 
between his own freedom and transcendence. 
However, as we have already noted at Cartier-Bresson: "I'm obsessed by one thing, the 
visual pleasure. The greatest joy for me is geometry; that means a structure. You can't 
go shooting for structure, for shapes, for patterns and all this, but it is a sensuous 
pleasure, an intellectual pleasure, at the same time to have eve1ything in the right 
place. It 's a recognition of an order which is infront of you " (Cartier-Bresson, 20 13). 
All in all , "poetry is the essence of everything, and it 's through deep contact with 
reality and living fully that you reach poetry " (Cartier-Bresson, 20 13). 
Conclusion: It is interesting to see how while Marcel directly understands that man is 
'imago Dei ', Cartier-Bresson understands that there is "the visual pleasure, a 
recognition of an order which is in front of you " (ibid). 
We could maintain a double interpretation for Cartier-Bresson: either point out that the 
photographer has become a demiurge (who from himself gives meaning and orders the 
world) or understand that Cartier-Bresson has discovered (without knowing it) the 
fourth way of God' s existence announced by Thomas Aquinas that the ordained needs 
an ordering person. In such a case, Cartier-Bresson would approach Marcel's belief 
that there is a creator and, in such a case, that man is a child of that God. For Gabriel 
Marcel this could be another sign of hope in Cartier-Bresson ' s photograph. 
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5.1.4) The int~rsubjectivity of othe1·s in Marcel & The p·erson at Cartier-Bresson 
For Marcel the fundamental forms of intersubjectivity are the personal encounter with 
another man, the family, the human community and the personal encounter with God. 
For his patt, Marcel highlighted these forms of intersubjectivity from the positive 
aspect, "although he did not forget the negative experiences of loneliness and despair, 
nor did he deny their importance, nor did he consider them to be fundamental human 
experiences" (Urabayen, 20 II, p. 33). 
In El Ser y tener ( 1965) Marcel makes this distinction between what is external and 
what is internal to the person, in what men do and in what men are. Marcel insisted 
that man was losing his sense of identity because of the industrialization of the time, so 
that men lived in a world of appearances because human beings are considered more 
for what they had than for what they really were essentially. Faced with such a situation, 
the philosophers of the world are called to become the defenders of the human. 
In this sense, Cmtier-Bresson ' s photographs ooze - predominantly - the positive 
meaning of human life after the disasters of the world wars. His reports and portraits 
focus on providing enough background context to understand the situation of people. 
Cartier-Bresson pointed out that he admired war photographer Robert Capa and that 
"the influence of Capa went beyond his lifetime. He was on the same wavelength with 
eve1ybody socially. He was not impressed by queens. He was impressed by everybody 
as a human being. He was facing them front. !liked Capafor that very much" (Cattier-
Bresson, 1973). 
Look at the other one. Cartier-Bresson is also one of the founders of humanist 
photography and, as such, "/ like to take a photograph of the person in his 
environment " (Capa, 1973). Like Marcel, it is of special interest to capture the essence 
of each man and woman in the photograph represented. '·But the most difjlcult thing 
for me is not street photography. It's a portrait. It's like a question mark you put on 
someone t1ying to say: what is the meaningofthatface? " (Cattier-Bresson, 1952, para. 
47). 
Cartier-Bresson spends enough time with the portrait. "Whereas with Ezra Pound, I 
stood in front of him for maybe an hour and a half in utter silence. We were looking at 
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each other in the eye. He was rubbing his fingers. I took maybe altogether one good 
photograph,four other possible, and two which were not interesting. That makes about 
six pictures in an hour and a half And no embarrassment on either side " (Capa, 1973). 
On the one hand, capturing people who develop actions in the world implies that 
Cartier-Bresson needs a degree of relationship and interactivity with the people he 
portrays. For Gabriel Marcel this would be another sign ofthe intersubjectivity of hope 
in Cartier-Bresson. That is, to have hope in others, because Cartier-Bresson is 
interested in discovering the photographic point of what he captures, in diving beyond 
appearances looking for a "shmpness avoiding that the presence, the artifice of the 
camera, kills the human truth " in front of him (Cartier-Bresson, 1973). 
5.1.5) Conclusions 
There is a 'walk in existence' for Gabriel Marcel which is a 'catching movement ' for 
Cartier-Bresson. While there is a 'I hope ' in Gabriel Marcel, 'I hope something 
happens' in Cartier-Bresson. 
Gabriel Marcel also wondered if his artistic life made him a better person. For Marcel, 
artistic life is an ethical life that translates into developing the four elements of the 
philosophy of hope that makes him wonder about his own incarnation, his itinerancy, 
his intimacy and intersubjectivity. However, Henri Cartier-Bresson put all his effort 
into enjoying the visual pleasure of composition and in search of the decisive moment, 
developing an incredible artistic capacity to recognize the order of beauty. And 
although he did not know a supernatural vision of hope, Cartier-Bresson recognized 
and admired in front of his camera 'the order of things'. Perhaps his photography 
lacked a sense of transcendence, but it allows the viewer to reach the natural beauty of 
the order created through his work, and therefore, seeing the creation represented in 
Cartier-Bresson' s photography, the viewer may wonder about his own personal 
existence. 
In short, we can conclude this chapter that Gabriel Marcel's hope has to be 
photographically: incarnate: photography is a means to expose the hope of bodies; 
itinerancy: which requires 'sculpting in time' (Tarkovsky, 1986) the 'punctum ' before 
a selection of various moving events; 3) intersubjectivity: which can be shown in the 
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various human relationships that people lend to each other; 4) and intimacy: where 
photography reflects the essence of the portrayed. 
Other secondary characteristics of hope for Marcel are: the active character of hope, 
which can be reflected by photographically capturing more actions than reactions; the 
increase in hope (in the face of the hopelessness that emerges) can be shown 
photographically in people overcoming crises, struggles and povetty. Finally, hope has 
a meaning in life beyond death, which photography can capture in moments of transit, 
funerals and burial. 
In this essay on Marcelian hope, we have attempted to teach that the future is a waiting 
in expectation that flees both from excess by presumption and from defect with 
anguish. Hopeful realism anchored in the ' imago Dei' that flees from 'naive optimism ' 
of those who think they live in the best of all possible worlds, nor from the 'pessimistic 
agorist ' who fears that this is true. A realism in the hope of Marcel love with the 
humanist gaze of Cartier-Bresson. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Having analyzed this hypothesis of hopeful photography as a theoretical-practical 
framework between Henri Cartier-Bresson and Gabriel Marcel, we will see in this 
chapter: I) whether this hopeful look at the work of the photojournalist in Kenya is 
possible and, subsequently, 2) whether it is also possible to create it for any potential 
citizen interested in African photography. 
6.1) The photographic hope of the photojournalist in Kenya 
Let us first see if it is possible this hopeful look at the work of the photojournalist in 
Kenya. 
As a photojournalist I want to find some elements to show how we photographers can 
improve the virtue of hope and also bring other positive photographic models, instead 
of hackneyed dramatic visual stereotypes that- without exception - mostly flood the 
news agencies of Kenya (and Africa). 
In order to do so, we will quickly question three factors that are related: I) the Kenyan 
reality, 2) the work for the news agencies and 3) the photojournalist covering the news. 
6.1.1) The photojournalist works on the basis of the Kenyan reality he finds 
This trait about reality is associated with intersubjectivity with others in Gabriel Marcel 
and the importance of person-centered photography in Cartier-Bresson. 
What is the reality or part of the Kenyan reality? Kenyan reality is rich, young and 
complex, with many lights and many shadows, but not unique or in the same trend. At 
least, broader than that reflected by international Media and agencies, with a plural 
reality and in constant change. 
Thus, according to Trading Economics (20 19) Kenya is one the most developed 
countries in East Africa. Currently, at the end of 2018, DGP has 5.9 percent growth. 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (including coffee and tea cultivation) is the largest 
sector of the economy and accounts for about 22 percent. Manufacturing is the second 
largest sector and represents around II percent of the GDP. Other major sectors 
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include: Real Estate (about 8 percent of total GOP), Wholesale and Retail Trade 
(around 7 percent), Transport and Storage (around 7 percent), Education (about 7 
percent), Financial and Insurance Activity (around 6 percent) and Construction (around 
5 percent) . 
Out of a population of more than 46 million, 75 percent of Kenya's population is under 
30 years of age and about 20 percent of the country is between the ages of 15 and 24 
(Kenya National Bureau ofStatistics, 2017, April 19). 
Beyond these generic data, we can see lights in infrastructure and investments. For 
example, Kenya has developed in recent years a high level of basic structures such as 
a ring road around Nairobi or the Nairobi-Mombasa speed train . New skyscrapers and 
shopping centers are also recognized, with the establishment of European companies 
(Carrefour, Decathlon, etc.) and Chinese investment in public works by the 
Government, such as the new headquarters of parliamentary offices . On the other hand, 
many international companies maintain their headquarters in Kenya as a gateway to 
Africa, including the United Nations headquarters with the UN-Habitat Programme or 
the Open Environment Programme. (In this sense Kenya is a pioneering country in the 
fight to eradicate plastic). Another field where the economy stands out is tea and coffee, 
along with floriculture in the export of roses to Europe. In addition, Kenya has 
developed extensive agreements with China (Reuters, 20 19) and other countries such 
as the USA. 
[n technology, Kenya is a reference as a pioneer for making payments, sending and 
receiving money through the mobile phone M-PESA. Also headquarter of lT 
companies in Africa are established in Nairobi and multinationals such as Google, 
Microsoft and others appear on university campuses in the country looking for job 
talents. 
However, the most pressing shadows can be observed precisely in education- together 
with povetty and corruption - because despite the increase in the number of students 
and the change of curricula to start primary school earlier, education is still not 
universal, with a jimnel 5ystem that gives priority to the best students. Only the best 
students with the best grades on national examinations can enter secondary school and 
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university. Thus, according to the latest ('ata from the Kenya National Bureau of 
Statistics (20 17, April 19), in 2016 there were l 0.3 million children enrolled in primary 
school, ofwhom 2.7 million reached secondary school. Finally, only 564,507 students 
had access to the University (that is, 5.4 7 percent of every 100 students in the country). 
This means that the hope of education for the majority ends at the end of primary 
school. Then, with 13 years, without the possibility of advancing in education, life 
becomes survival. With hardly any basic training, young people find difficult prospects, 
urged to seek life in order to get incomes in order to survive. As the World Bank (20 16) 
points out "There is a mismatch between the aspirations that any young person has 
and the opportunities available to them. Most Kenyan youth have high hopes, but there 
is an education system that stiffers from problems of access, quality and relevance. " 
But if the lack of education is one of the country' s main shoticomings, we can also find 
examples of motivation in these same difficulties. Examples of hope are reflected 
annually in the results ofthe national KCPE and KCSE examinations. Success stories, 
such as Gloria Odhiambo (Njeru, 20 18), a 13-year-old student from the Kibera slum 
who wakes up every day at 2 a.m. to read and study by candlelight in the tiny room she 
shares with her father, a cleaner. Gloria has one of the highest scores in Kenya on 
primary exams .. . but the international medi2. shows very little of this kind of 
achievement, more focused on the hopelessness sun·ounding life in Kibera slum. 
ln short, beyond this macroeconomic and microeconomic data, life is fertile in Kenyan 
everyday life. It is rich country in stories, with a variety of information. These small 
buttons can be used by international media to discover areas of reality that are less 
frequented by them. Real examples that could serve to give a better and more complete 
understanding of the struggles and hopes of daily life: intense traffic, people in matatu 
or in UBER on the way to work, etc. Contexts of contrasts and transformations of a 
nation beyond the repeated stereotypes of misery and exoticism. 
6.1.2) The photojournalist works according to the interests of the agency 
(This feature of the agency's informative follow-up can be associated with Gabriel 
Marcel's time roaming and capturing "the decisive moments " at Cartier-Bresson). 
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Since we live in a globalized world- where any event has international relevance due 
to the economic or geopolitical repercussion on third parties - we briefly study the 
international photographic agencies. In 2016, the Swiss Propaganda Research Centre 
released a repmt that begins with the following quote in its introduction: 
"What we see written in a newspaper or magazine about another country, how do those 
media know? The amwer may come as a surprise: The main source of information is 
the news agencies. These, which operate almost anonymously, are in a way the key to 
world events. So what are these agencies called, how do they work, and who finances 
them? If you think you are well iriformed about what is going on in the East and West, 
you should know how to answer this question' " (Holme, 1977, p. 11 ). 
Almost half a century later the paradigm seems almost the same and agencies wrap up 
the world of data and facts. Today mainly, the three major international agencies are 
AP, AFP and Reuters. Companies also in Kenya. According to the report of the Swiss 
Research Centre on Propaganda and the websites of these media offer information 
about them. Thus: 
I. American Associated Press (AP) , headquartered in New York and founded in 
1846, has about 4,000 employees worldwide, 265 locations (including Nairobi) and is 
used by some 12,000 international media, reaching more than half of the world's 
population daily. For example, 2,000 stories are edited daily and its photo service sends 
one million images and 50,000 videos each year. (https://www.ap.org). 
2. Agence France-Presse (AFP), a French agency based in Paris and founded in 
1835, has about 4,000 employees, with 200 offices in 150 countries (including Kenya) 
sending more than 3,000 daily news and photos to media around the world. It offers 
more than 20,000 contents every day. (https://www.afp.com). 
3. Reuters, a British agency founded in London in 1851, is privately owned and 
employs 2,500 people, 600 photojournalists and 200 offices worldwide (including 
Nairobi). Reuters was acquired in 2008 by Canadian businessman Thomson and 
became Thomson Reuters. In recent years it has specialized in economic information 
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and markets. Reuters broadcasts news m the world ' s twelve major languages. 
(https://www.reuters.com). 
In addition, the big television companies and newspapers with correspondents in Kenya 
(BBC, CNN, The New York Times, The Guardian, etc.) together with the three big 
agencies and other smaller ones such as the Spanish Efe, the German DPA or the 
American supplier of stock images Getty Images, are the international loudspeakers 
from Nairobi to the world. 
"The logic of exclusion begins when a terri/my - region, nation or community of 
interest-lacks structures and organizations to articulate, take advantage of and export 
the information it produces. It has its roots in mechanisms of domination by the great 
powers and has always been perceived as an instrument of power[. . .] The north-south 
axis is an economic but also an informative dependence [. . .] Vety few countries have 
a recognized instrument to tell, in their own way, the reality of the world" (Muro, 2006, 
chap. l ). A reality of the world that is told by the American AP, the British Reuters or 
the French AFP. As Mark Twain said, "There are only two forces that can carry light 
to all the corners of the globe .. . the sun in the heavens and the Associated Press down 
here ". 
Therefore, the light of these communication agenctes still today builds the daily 
narrative about the identity of the Kenya brand abroad. Thus, when a news story about 
Kenya can be considered 'international in scope·, the news agencies in Nairobi are 
entrusted with the mission of covering the news in order to forward it to the national 
subscribed media of each country. According to the Swiss Propaganda Research Centre 
(20 16), "the natianal media receive news from agencies and often limit themselves to 
copying and translating the reports of the major AP, Reuters, or AFP agencies " 
coming from Kenya. 
"In fact, not only the text, but also the images, sound and video recordings that we 
encounter in our media every day, are mostly from the very same agencies. What the 
uninitiated audience might think of as contributions from their local nevvspaper or TV 
station, are actually copied reports from New York (AP), London (Reuters) and Paris 
(AFP)" (Swiss Propaganda Research, 20 16). 
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lP short, the same contents are discreetly spread throughout the global villa:~e and 
thanks to the international agencies a surprising similarity is created in the informative 
angle of the news about any country, such as Kenya. Thus, from Stockholm to Lagos, 
from Moscow to Tokyo, from Sao Paulo to Delhi, international media information is 
standardized by these agencies. Therefore, obviously, if the vision of a country by the 
agencies is stereotyped or simplified, it will also be reproduced globally. 
On the one hand, each international agency in Nairobi will treat Kenyan news 
according to the 'agenda setting ' established by the headquarters according to their 
national information criteria and economic, ideological, cultural, geo-strategic 
interests, etc. 
On the other hand, this is natural: each company has its own objectives and corporate 
culture depending on the country of origin and the agencies pursue different objectives 
depending on the relations between Kenya and the readers and listeners of that third 
country, which receives the news (or the omission of news about Kenya) . 
All this is understandable. What should not be admissible is a continually utilitarian 
approach to information, both in the selection of news concealment and the systematic 
repetition of others to create or perpetuate cliches of cultural, economic or ideological 
dominance over a country. In this sense, it is enough to cite the recent terrorist attack 
by AI Shabab on dusit02 and the Kenyan citizens ' criticism of the New York Times ' 
double information standard between the Kenyan victims of the attack and the 
American victims of 9/11 terrorism from the photographic point of view in the pages 
of the main paper ofNew York (De Freitas, 2015, January 15). 
Although the reality is complt:x, if we make a broad study of the information that each 
agency transmits through its channels, it would seem that certain countries or topics 
were assigned by previous stereotypes depending on the interests created by each 
international corporation about a country. Messages that permeate public opinion and 
the subconscious of each reader-spectator. 
Thus, as an example, it would suffice to ask each foreigner: what ideas or visual 
impressions does he associate with his conscience when we mention the word ' Kenya '? 
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The collectiv (~ imaginary received is corruption, tribalism, slums, nepotism, poverty 
and terrorism of Al-Shabab. That is pornomisery. At the same time, at the other extreme 
we find scenes of safaris, beaches, wild animals, adventure. That is exoticism. 
In any case, the photojournalist should look at things differently so as not to fall into 
the stereotypes of African cliches. This is a subject that we will develop in the following 
chapters. 
6.1.3) The photojournalist works according to his own acquired photographic 
gaze 
(This feature could be associated with the background that each photographer has. 
That is, their own incarnation and intimacy in words of Gabriel Marcel, and in the 
communication of a recognition of the external order to Cartier-Bresson) . 
In addition to working on a specific Kenyan reality and for an agency (with a corporate 
culture of their own) each photojournalist has a look of their own, fruit of their 
temperament, character, encouragement, family, experiences and other backgrounds. 
However, it can be said that - with all that baggage - the photojournalist faces the 
reality in front of him: in this case, working as a photojournalist in Kenyan life. 
So we have two raw materials in itself: the photojournalist himself and reality itself. 
And as essayist Susan Sontag (2015, p. 240) has pointed out, "photography is- before 
anything else- a way of looking. It is not the look itself". And we point out that it is 
not the same reality either; they are both: a way of looking (of the photographer) at the 
world (Kenya) where he lives; a professirmal way of situating oneself before the real 
(in this place and under these concrete cir.::umstances following Gabriel Marcel) . 
And this is a key point. In other words, what is important is not simply reality (in itself), 
but how the photojournalist sees reality. Because each photojournalist has his or her 
own gaze on the world, a weltanschauung or an intentionality, which makes him or her 
different from the rest of photojournalists. 
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Therefore, two notes each photojournalist has his own look at Kenyan reality. To these 
is added the third point: intentionality. A photojournalist also becomes the reality he 
wants or seeks according to the good/evil to which each one aspires. 
[n other words, we enter into the difficult working relationship between the company 
and the photojournalist in terms of the selection of daily topics to be covered which -
as we have said in the previous chapter- are practically given by the editors and the 
agency ' s own agenda setting. 
Perhaps the photojournalist in an agency cannot select almost anything of what he likes 
in many occasions, but we already know that life is not always what you want. [n 
addition to the planned themes, each photojournalist should develop his or her talents 
simultaneously- both in the subjects they like, as well as in those they don 't- as long 
as the coverage respects the professional ethics and dignity of the people portrayed. 
[n spite of everything, the human choices that we take as photojournalists are relevant 
in an agency. They are not innocuous or should be taken at random, but every action in 
photographic creation dignifies or vulgarizes us, because there is always one last 
intentionality. Therefore, there are no aseptic images or aseptic themes, because there 
is always a final objective for which to make or reject a photographic coverage (even 
the lack of intentionality is in itself an intentionality). 
[n the latter case, when the photojournalist does not always agree with the news agency, 
he will know how to seek the orientation of an approach and a minimum space of 
freedom on the proposed subject to offer his own photographic perspective. The human 
relations of a company should be collaborative between employees and superiors. The 
latter should combine the development of the agency with the development of the 
worker' s talents. 
Finally, agencies or the public should not consider the photographer a go-between. [n 
other words, for a reader to be able to demand the right to truthful, free and responsible 
information, the photojournalist must first be able to work freely and responsibly by 
taking charge of his or her own professional acts. 
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In short, in the necessary triple relationship of 'reality-agency-photojmtrnalist ' we can 
find in the subject of the camera three types of gazes in front of the world: 'gaze of 
resignation '; a second 'gaze of acceptance', and a superior gaze that we will call a 
'gaze of redemption ', which in the end is the photograph of Marcel ' s considered hope 
in Cartier-Bresson. 
a) Outlook of resignation 
The word that defines a photographer's professional life in the face of a world of 
contrasts can be 'bewilderment'. Usually, the journalist or photojournalist is a person 
with a lively critical thought, able to mix through his work with all social classes: from 
a politician, to a development worker, a religious leader or a poor slammer. 
In this way, the photographer can get to know the human condition in all its extension 
throughout his working life, discovering the contradictions and incoherencies of people 
and ideologies. 
Coupled with the harsh reality of the profession (and other external causes such as 
precarious working conditions, professional instability, stress, exhaustion ... ), the 
danger may be for the photographer that if he criticizes people and ideologies it is not 
accompanied in parallel by a healthy inne!" criticism (that is: 'the world is bad, but how 
can I also improve the world that corresponds to me? ') there is the frequent risk of 
falling into a pessimistic vision, of a comprehensive status before life. Thus it is 
frequent to observe photojournalists who turn their initial realistic gaze into a resigned 
and professional skeptical gaze with the passage oftime. 
As Pieper and Marcel have warned in this essay of hope, tiredness or the proof of 
momentary despair is not necessarily bad, but a natural process in human walking. 
However, the initial problem of despair can become a chronic situation when it settles 
to stay in the life of a journalist. We could say that the problem increases when some 
professionals jump from initial skepticism to more or less permanent cynicism. 
And as the Polish photojournalist Ryszard Kapuscinski points out: "our profession 
cannot be exercised correctly by anyone who is cynical. It is necessmy to differentiate: 
it is one thing to be skeptical, realistic, prudent. This is absolutely necessary, otherwise 
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you couldn't do journalism. Something very d(ferent is to be cynical, an attilude 
incompatible with the profession of journalist. Cynicism is an inhuman attitude that 
automatically distances us from our profession, at least if one conceives it in a ve1y 
serious way[ . .] In my life I have met hundreds of great, wonderfitl journalists who 
were vety serious; in general very human persons" (2002, p. 53). 
This is the idea. Kapuscinski points out that cynicism supposes the negation of reality 
and that "cynics are no goodfor this job" (2002, p.53). We may become skeptical, but 
never cynical. To fall into cynicism would be to settle into Pieper's 'status 
comprehensoris' of one who believes (falsely) that he already knows the whole reality 
and, in the end, is nothing more than a return to the profession (or life). 
Because if we live in a 'status comprehensoris' we stop growing internally, also as 
professionals. We will be in a 'closed time' (of having) and not in an 'open time' (of 
being) indicated by Marcel. And in 'status comprehensoris' we close our eyes - and 
what is worse, our mind- to photographic reality and, consequently, fruit of tiredness 
or abandonment, the 'status comprehensoris ' will catch us repeating photographic 
cliches, because reality will have ceased to interest us. 
The question then assails us: Should we photojournalists take a critical look at an unjust 
world? A critical look, yes. Should we exercise a photojournalism of denunciation? 
Yes, when that injustice cries out to heaven. The problem could be that we turn 
everything into 'a denunciation' and, by repeating the denunciation, we swallow the 
portion of the poison, and become simple denouncers. Scalded over the years we can 
fall into despair and the violence of despair and as such, the only thing clear is that 
despair- if not overcome - is a dead end. 
Paraphrasing Hannah Arendt, "violence can always destroy power, but it is absolutely 
incapable of creating it" ( 1970, p. 73). And this is the point. With eyes closed by the 
despair of cynicism it is impossible to create a photographic life that defends the dignity 
of the person. And yet this is the challenge of the photographer and the person. The 
experience of Marcel and Pieper tells us that "the existential analysis shows that on the 
basis of hope one finds oneself in a situation that invites 'to despair ' and that it is 
precisely this hope that consists in overcoming despair" (Urabayen, p. 158). This is the 
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challenge of the photojournalist: to open one's eyes once. agam to the hope that 
cynicism may have blinded. 
In short: I) this look of resignation is a momentary or permanent closed time where 
there is hardly any hope. (Even less so if one falls into a state of cynicism). 2) On the 
other hand, we have to consider the temptation of hopelessness as something real that 
will come throughout our lives because it also forms part of human nature. 3) However, 
what is important is not hopelessness itself (or reality itself), but how we see reality 
and whether we face the problem of hopelessness as an opportunity to seek meaning 
again. 4) Therefore, it is necessary to know how to face despair. Because in the face of 
despair, one either grows or dies. 5) In short, the photographer will end up opting for a 
hope or hopelessness, for an open time (in 'status viatoris ')or a closed time (the 'status 
comprehensoris ') in his professional life. 
b) Acceptance outlook 
The second look also aims to improve society. We use the ideas of the American writer 
Flannery O ' Connor (1925-1964) in defense of what we could call 'the really real' , 
because about photography and its spectators we can say the same as about literature: 
"My readers are the people who believe that God is dead. At least those are the people 
for whom I am aware that 1 write " (Fijo, 2004 ). "Stories are stroY!.g, it is true, but they 
are strong because there is nothing stronger than Christian realism. The complete 
reality is the Incarnation and 1 know that no one believes in the Incarnation anymore, " 
writes 0 'Connor in one of his letters (20 14). Thus, O'Connor proposes a transcendental 
belief like Marcel. Each incarnate body- as Marcel said- can be redeemed by knowing 
its intimacy and destiny. 
On the one hand, the photographic reality of the incarnated bodies must be shown 
without naivety. On the other hand, as we pointed out about the nature of photography 
with the Jewish writer Simone Veil: "imaginGly evil is [conceived as] romantic, 
varied; real evil is [however J sad monotonous, desert, tedious. [On the other hand] the 
imaginary good is [portrayed} boring; [however J the real good is always new, 
wonde1jul intoxicating[ .. } It does not escape this alternative unless, by force of art, it 
passes from the side of reality, something that only genius can do" ( 1994, p. I I I). 
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This is the relevant point: how to offer an incarnated good or a photograph that 
expresses the good in an attractive way without making it seem naive? How to show 
the force of the good in photographic modernity? Only geniuses or artists know how to 
do this. 
In short, in this second look of acceptance, the photographer statts from a realistic sense 
of the world in 'status viatoris ',with open-mindedness and a certain human hope. This 
can be seen in quite a few works by Cattier-Bresson, of empathy with the others 
photographed, in open time where one wishes to trap the photographic reality. Or as 
the award-winning war photojournalist James Nachtwey points out, five times winner 
of the Robert Capa Gold Medal, twice photo of the year in the World Press Photo, 
twice Bayeux Prize for foreign correspondents, seven times winner of the Magazine 
Photographer of the Year, Leica Prize, Doctor Honoris Causa for Massachusetts 
School of the Arts . . . : "What pushes me to follow and helps me overcome physical and 
emotional obstacles is to have faith in journalism. I think it has value in itself and the 
ability to transform situations and raise people 's consciousness. Journalism is offering 
people something they read and see and something about whom andwhat to worry 
about. Something to take care of I haven 't seen the time or the moment to throw in the 
towel because I've shared moments with people who have literally lost everything: their 
homes, their families , their way of life, or their clothes. With people who have suffered 
on an epic scale and have not given up or given up. Being poor does not mean being 
hopeless. So if they didn 't give up, if there was hope, humor and kindness in those 
places, what right do I have to give up? " (Gaviria, 20 15). 
c) Outlook of redemption 
What James Nachtwey is offering us is the third photographic gaze to understand the 
world: it is not simply about accepting the reality of my own incarnation, but trying to 
give it meaning, transforming it and redeeming it. Man is the only rational animal that 
can intentionally transform a reality. Let's do with a full professional life that begins in 
the photographic attempt to overcome cliches and stereotypes. "To act slowly but good 
handwriting: doing things well it matters more than doing them ", teaches the Spanish 
poet Antonio Machado (2003, pt. XXIV). To think and to think again, to do things well. 
Not to live in inertia, because we are rational beings. It is the overcoming of the great 
photographers who have contributed a revisionism if to fall continuously in what 
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already seen. This can be seen in many cf Cartier-Bresson's photos, or those of Robert 
Frank in his book The Americans, or in Dorothea Lange' s iconic photos of the mother 
displaced in Farm Security Administration during the time of the American recession. 
We can say that a photographer does not sell images: a photographer sells a look, his 
personal look. Because to photograph is easy; the difficult thing is to have a 
contemplative look. And looking means seeing with other eyes. In other words, as 
Marcel Proust is said about art: "it 's about looking at old objects with new eyes". 
This is precisely the best definition of a photojournalist in 'status viatoris ' as opposed 
to another in 'status comprehensoris ': "t1ying to look at old objects every day with new 
eyes". With this availability, the photographer, the writer or the journalist has an open 
attitude of expectation and surprise before the world that comes to meet him. 
In this opening of the 'status viatoris ' it is possible not only to discover stereotypes but 
also to replace them. The stereotypes in the images can be assimilated to slogans and 
cettain texts. In other words, "the souls of both reside in continuous repetition. They 
are like a mantra that prevents us from thinking, only swallowing, " said Czech 
playwright and former president Vaclav Havel: "language, made sentences, slogans 
organize people 's lives, appropriate people, are objects of worship andfaith " ( 1997, 
p. l7). 
Precisely because cliches prevent us from thinking, they demand to be rethought. 
Stereotypes are generic ideas ('a catchphrase' as Havel says). And faced with the 
generic, we remember and insist on the idea of Marcel, for whom existence is always 
personal, concrete incarnated in someone with intimacy and circumstances of his own. 
And what Marcel asks is to discover, to think about that personal intimacy of each one 
and of the other in order to avoid any generalization, which is an injustice, because it 
makes me treat others as disincarnated beings. For this reason, one should not allow 
oneself to be led by labels for the judgments of others. 
Moreover, to discover what is concrete is to define a problem. It is already working on 
the problem. That' s why we also have to work on them, because in order to eliminate 
some photographic stereotypes we must also replace them with other new photographic 
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visions, with new i:ieas, because the head works with the ideas and images it has. We 
cannot leave an empty head. The mind does not think in white, empty, but with ideas 
and images. We must replace old ideas with new ideas. Old images for new images. 
And for that we need to look at reality- as we have said- the same objects with new 
words. 
[n short, this redemptive gaze of the photojournalist can be defined as 'the culmination ' 
of the 'hopeful gaze', the perfect symbiosis that brings together the characteristics of 
Cartier-Bresson with Marcel's existentialist philosophy. 
There is a transforming desire in the moments when this hopeful or redemptive gaze 
appears (which is not always). Essentially when, in addition to accepting the world, 
there is a superior technical and ethical creative effort that grabs the 'punctum ' 
(Barthes, L 990) to represent its appearance with strength, beauty and intensity and, 
moreover, breaks the usual gaze (stereotypes about something or someone). 
6.1.4) Conclusions on the photojournalist 
We have widely considered the figure of the photojournalist versus the importance of 
reality and agency for several reasons: 
I) Because freedom is always internal and does not depend on the external 
circumstances of reality or the agency for which a photojournalist works. Although 
both agency and reality can condition the photojournalist, they can never determine 
him until they take away his inner freedom and his ability to opt for hope or not. 
2) Because the ethics of virtue corresponds to the concrete man (incarnated 
according to Marcel), who has the ethical path imprinted on his conscience. Faced with 
a deontological ethic or a utilitarian ethic that the Agencies propose, in the last case, 
the photojournalist always has ethics in virtue. Whether there are laws or not, the true 
rule is always impressed in the heart of the man who leads him to exercise the good of 
virtue, as Aquinas pointed out. 
3) [t is sometimes difficult to change the corporate culture of an agency or of 
Kenyan society. But what the photojournalist does do is change himself and work in 
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favor or not of hope. Mayb~ the photographer cannot change reality, but as a 
photojournalist he can change the way he faces the 'status viatoris ': with or without 
hope. In short, to dissolve into nothingness or to become personally and professionally 
something in hope. "To say it clearly: in a line ofFreudian thought, to die is truly to 
be undone, while for me it is to be fulfilled," says Marcel (Marcel, 20 12, p. 59). 
4) The photographer must also seek technical and practical perfection. His 
images must seek excellence and the moral good photographed should reflect the 
dignity of the human condition. This photograph that I take: is it technically well done 
and does what I have photographed and the intention to perfect myself as a 
photographer and a person help me? 
There must be a technical and ethical growth of the self as a photographer and as a 
person. If the professional is separated from the personal, the technique of ethics, there 
will be no reasons in the actions. 
That is to say, it will be simple a devastating pragmatism, acting without direction: 
simply making. "The scholastics said: 'Verum est ens', being is the truth. Later on, the 
Italian philosopher Giambattista Vi co ( 1688-17 44) opposes this with another formula: 
'Verum quia factum'; this means that the only thing we can recognize as true is what 
we ourselves have done. This formula marks the beginning of the authentic modern 
spirit" (Ratzinger, 20 L 6, p. 267). 
Today it seems that only the life of certain media is understood as a saturation of 
technical production ( 'poiesis '). Technical quantity often beats informative quality. In 
the appearance and disappearance of news there comes a time when production seems 
to be the only way to go . This is a 'dead end' for the photojournalist because, not only 
does he put his profession at risk, but a life without meaning, without direction and 
without questions. Then, there is a risk of breaking because the person, the 
photographer is unstructured- although he does not intuit it-. 
In this sense we point out that there are not two people: the professional and the simple 
citizen. There is only one person. There is only one life with unity of life because the 
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l:l.ctions are diverse, but the person is uniqu:! with the same will , the same intelligence 
and heart to act. 
5) In short, from a practical point of view, this hopeful view of the photographer 
in Kenya can and must aspire to transform this African corner of the world. And this 
can be concretized in: 
a) If we want to eliminate hackneyed stereotypes, we must offer other 
contents. Intelligence does not work empty: it must be replaced and updated by 
other ideas. 
b) Looking at reality with new eyes is not an easy task. We remember 
that hundreds of times by millions of eyes this garden of the reality ofthe world 
has been crossed by expert photographers. For this reason, it is not easy to create 
new photographs or visions for old objects about violence, war, poverty, wealth. 
humanity, etc. 
c) That photojournalists should be proactive looking for topics not 
previously reported under a positive approach . The idea is to offer another angle 
of the news giving the reader-spectato!' a crust that others do not offer. For 
example, in the AI Shabaab terrorist attack in dusit02 (Nairobi) a journalist can 
focus exclusively on the drama of photos of the victims (cf. New York Times), 
or also focus on other elements of solidarity that existed in the attack: help to 
the victims, blood donations, etc. 
d) That capturing reality in an attractive way reqUires a triple 
characteristic: I) execute the work technically well 2) execute the work 
ethically well and 3) grasp the 'punctum ' for represent the appearance with 
strength, beauty and intensity that can never be naive . 
6.2) Photographic hope in potential African photographers 
Let us see whether it is possible to create this redemptive hopeful gaze on any potential 
photographer in Kenya, especially among youth. For that, two points: 
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6.2.1) Leaming to look: visual literacy 
For centuries visual communication was relevant in the lives of men with the painting 
of images before the invention of writing. Also later- for example during the Middle 
Ages- European cathedrals offered a visual iconography to catechize believers. Today, 
just as we learn to write or learn to read, we must 'learn to look' in the face of the 
uncontrolled "fwy of images " (Fontcuberta, 20 16). In a world of screens and visual 
impacts a 'visual literacy ' is needed, because- since we get up- our eyes spend their 
lives open, watching the scenes of the world. 
So, it is necessary to know how to discriminate and to have our own control over the 
images that hit us. Having a critical attitude about what we see requires analyzing, 
understanding and even creating images about reality. For this reason, it is necessary 
to understand the ethical and aesthetic visual rules, having a critical thought before the 
photographs that try to dominate and abduct our external sense of sight. 
In shott, as Felten defends, we should acquire 'visual literacy ', as we have for example 
other skills for numbers or texts. "In this rapidly changing world, visual literacy, 
whether conceptualized as a distinct set of capacities or as part of a larger multimodal 
literacy, should be recognized among the fundamental goals of a liberal education. 
This review highlights four categories of resources essential for understanding visual 
literacy in higher education: (1) foundations; (2) visual cognition and perception; (3) 
visual design; and ( 4) teaching visual literacy " (2008, p. 60). 
For this reason, we recommend subjects of visual and cultural communication in the 
education of youth. An example is the book Images for primary school. Aprender a 
mira.~ by the Ministry of Public Education of Mexico ( 1998), with the idea of 
sensi~:izing children in art education through photographs with works of art from the 
country. 
6.2.2) Acquiring a glimpse of hope: workshops 
The creation of digital photography workshops can serve as a support to acquire a 
hopeful look at everyday life, as Mwelu Foundation (2007) does in Mathare ' s difficult 
slum. This foundation created twelve years ago by Julius Mwelu (a resident of the 
Mathare slum) who works with a group of 80 young people from the slum to develop 
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their potential througn photography, film production and building life skills in the 
neighborhood under two different programs. 
One program is for children up to the age of 17 and another is for young people up to 
the age of25. In addition, according to their corporate website, they count on the local 
population to make a positive change within the slum community itself, giving hope 
and overcoming the cycle of poverty and violence in Mathare. As they point out on 
their website Mwelu Foundation (2007) "currently the organization has produced over 
10 professional photographers who have worked in media houses, fashion/model and 
photo documentaries. The foundation has a wide range of photographer who offer free 
service in community reporting, event coverage and commercial works". 
Another example of influence and hope are the photography workshops with 
recognized professionals, such as photojournalist Gary Knight of Canon. The idea is to 
train enthusiastic local photographers to learn how to capture the reality of the country's 
ordinary life: a good example for telling visual stories that break cliches (Canon, 20 15). 
As you can see, the photographic ability with intentionality is easily assumed today 
even with the camera of a mobile phone. 
But a camera is not enough. Since aesthetics is an expression of ethics, people will 
reflect the inner world they carry according to their own circumstances. Therefore, the 
more an ethic of personal virtue can be developed from primary education onwards, 
the more likely the potential photographer will be to express a hopeful conception of 
the world. 
In other words, 2 photographer with hope is a potential seed that will require care of 
the eatth, rain, a gardener, etc. That is to say, the family, the school, the environment. .. : 
love. Only a person can offer a glimpse of hope if, usually, he has received love, because 
one gives what one has. 
In short, in order to create a look of hope, it will always be easier for a person, a young 
person, to have had a stable structured life in a positive atmosphere of family and 
affective growth in order to return that constructed look to society itself. Only those 
who have hope can give love. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation we have analyzed and attempted to answer the three research 
questions on 1) the characteristics of the ethics of hope in Gabriel Marcel 2) the 
distinctive notes in Cartier-Bresson's humanist photography, 3) the symbiosis between 
the two authors in a 'redemptive gaze '. In addition, we have also seen if it is possible 
to show a hopeful photographic vision in Kenya for photographers and potential 
photographers . 
To put it another way, these three questions can be found in the following literary 
explanation of man by the philosopher C.S. Lewis ( 1898-1963). Words pronounced 
during the Second World War, September 20, 1942 before the listeners of the BBC: 
"There are two ways in which man spoils himself: the first has to do 
with individuals turning away from each other, deceiving or 
assaulting each other[. . .] The second has to do ·with things spoiling 
within an individual... You can get a pretty clear idea if you think of 
us as a .fleet of ships sailing in pelfectformation. The voyage will be 
a success only if firstly, the ships do not collide with each other or 
cross paths and if, secondly, each ship is in good condition and its 
machines are working" (Lewis, 1996, p. 87). 
On the one hand, Lewis is talking about the success of the mission of a fleet of boats if 
there is individual ethics (if each boat is in good condition) and, on the other hand, if 
there is social ethics (if the boats do not collide with each other). 
7.1) On personal and social ethics in the photojournalist 
Let' s consider the ethics of photojournalists. We also establish that individual ethics 
can be equated with the ideas of Gabriel Marcel (knowledge of my existential intimacy) 
while social ethics could be equated with photography in Cartier-Bresson, who wishes 
to join others while portraying the world. 
If man must prevent the boat from breaking down to sail, the person, the photojournalist 
must remain afloat in the face of the hopelessness of the torments of life, as we have 
explained with Gabriel Marcel (200 1 ). For this: 1) the photojournalist must be 
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consistent with printed ethical principles and that anyone can discover in his heart, 
struggling to acquire an ethic of virtue that forges his character and develops his 
redemptive gaze through the coherence between his thought and his life; 2) Personal 
ethics also implies that the photojournalist's boat is checked in the consciousness 
workshop from time to time to find out its own vital condition. 
Thus, by checking the boat in his own inspection, the photojournalist will be able to 
recognize his glance of hope in a moment of walking terrain. Then, the photographer 
will discover the phase of gaze of resignation, acceptance or redemption before the 
itinerancy in the sea of life. As we know, gazes can change in the face of different 
existential circumstances. 
Although the individual has his or her own personal mission, personal ethics only have 
a place in an ethics in communion with other ships, in a mission. In Cartier-Bresson ' s 
photography it is the desire to reflect people at a decisive moment in time. This ethic 
involves approaching other ships- people- with human and technical delicacy with a 
two-way photographer-reality that always puts the dignity of the portrayed in front of 
it. 
"But there is one thing we have not considered: to know where the 
fleet is heading. Because their journey could be a failure if their 
destination was New York and we arrived. .. in Calcutta" (Lewis, 
1996, p. 87). 
And as the philosopher Kreeft asks "but third, and most important of all, the fleet of 
ships, they must know why the fleet is at sea in the first place. What is their mission, 
their destination?" ( 1989). 
7.2) In the voyage of life 
On the fate of the ship on the journey of life, it is about answering the question, as 
Gabriel Marcel says, that I am on "a path but ... towards what awakening?" (20 12). 
Mutatis mutandis, for the photojournalist could be these questions: what path do I take 
in my life? What do I do with my profession? What does my photojournalistic vocation 
mean? And then, where do I go? With what gaze? 
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ln short, all these questions could be summed up in one idea for Marcel: if l do not 
know who I am and what I am here for, I will not know where I have to go, or with 
what gaze (whatever it is). 
A nuance: photography or the photographic gaze cannot be the end in itself of a person 
or of a photojournalist. Photography- like any other profession- is a means to an end. 
The only essential end is love between the creature and the creator, as we have seen in 
Marcel. In sh011, following the natural inclination of the will inscribed in the person 
( 'voluntas ut natura') we can point out that - for Marcel - the primary and essential 
character of the meaning of my life as a creature would have as its 'final objective 
purpose ' the encounter with the creator (with the help of supernatural hope). And, on 
the other hand, my 'final subjective purpose ' will be professional human perfection 
through my redemptive photographic vocation (with the help of natural hope). 
7.3) Modern individualism 
At the final point of the dissettation we have studied whether photographers can offer 
hope in Kenya. In analogy with the words of CS Lewis we find that the British thinker 
makes a sharp observation: 
"Perhaps you have noticed that modern people are almost always 
thinking about justice and harmony between individuals and 
forgetting the other two (about individual ethics and the mission of 
the journey). When a man says of something he wants to do 'it can't 
be bad, because it doesn't hurt anyone', he is only thinking of this 
first thing. He thinks that it does not matter how his boat is inside as 
long as it does not collide with the ship next door " [. .. } (Lewis, 1996, 
p. 87). 
"Almost all people of all times have agreed in the01y that human 
beings should be honest, kind and helpful to one another. But unless 
we progress in the order within each human being, we are deceiving 
ourselves. What is the point of teaching ships to maneuver to avoid 
collisions if they are really junk in such a bad state that they cannot 
be maneuvered at all? What is the point of outlining rules of social 
behavior on paper if we know that, in fact, our greed, our cowardice, 
our ·wrong character, and our vanity are going to prevent that we 
comply?" (ibid, p. 87). 
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"I do not want to say for c moment that we should not thii1k, and 
think a lot, about improving our social and economic system. What I 
mean to say is that all those thoughts remain in borage waters unless 
we realize that nothing but the courage and generosity of individuals 
will make any system work properly. You cannot make men good by 
law. And without good men a good society is not possible " (ibid, p. 
88). 
In short, during the voyage by boat we find this aptitude of modern individualism 
criticized by CS Lewis, of which he wishes to live a supposed fragmentation between 
'public life' and 'private life', thinking that the personal situation of the ship does not 
affect others. This fragmentation of life is the corruption towards individualism, which 
sooner or later evades its own responsibility. And while it denies itself in the personal 
transformation it demands from others the social transformation, as C.S. Lewis says 
( 1996). As Aristotle pointed out (Polftica, Libro m, cap. IV), "men are a social being 
by nature". And as philosopher Taylor clarifies: "Discovering my identity for myself 
does not mean that I make it in isolation but that I do my life through dialogue, partly 
open with others [ .. ]My own entity depends crucially on my dialogical relationship 
with others " (1994, p. 81 ). "Because forms that opt for self-realization without 
considering the demands of our ties with others destroy the conditions for realizing 
authenticity itself" ( 1994, p. 71 ). 
Definitely, if man refuses contact with other ships and avoids giving the best of his 
talents, the photographer cannot transform the world. The gaze on others will be a 
distant gaze, when the first photographic principle is precisely the closeness to the 
object. "If your photo is not good enough, you are not close enough" (Capa, 20 15). 
We end these conclusions with the inscription on the bow of the Greek ships: "The 
difficult thing is not to live, but to set a course " (Labrada, l998, p. 16). In this 
dissertation we have tried to navigate and set a course throughout the history of hope 
and photography. And we have seen with Marcel and Cartier-Bresson - along with 
other thinkers- that taking charge of the needs and hopes of Kenyans is only possible 
from a redemptive vision of photography learning to look, that is, precisely from the 
closeness of love, because as Jutta Burggraf (20 1 0) points out in tune with Marcel: 
"Only those who love the world will be able to tramform it ". Also from a camera. 
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